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On "Undominated Diversity"

TATEIWA Shin'ya立岩 真也) January 2010
Japanese Version
The Second Workshop with Professor Philippe Van Parijs

  * translation by Robert Chapeskie

  Since last year I have been writing about BI (Basic Income). These writings, along with additions, corrections where necessary, and contributions by Taku Saito, longtime researcher in this field and translator of "Real Freedom for All" (Van Parijs [1995, Japanese trans. 2009]), are to be published in book form by Seidosha in March. Here I examine what is discussed in chapter three of the book cited above.

 ■1 The idea of "Undominated Diversity"

  It seems clear that since each individual is different there are problems with providing exactly the same dispensation to everyone. If we attempt to implement the idea of providing a BI to all, must we not also at the same time dispense differing amounts of income [based on the differing needs of individuals]? There are some who are concerned about this. At the same time, however, among those who support BI there may be some who worry that this kind of differentiation will destroy the simplicity of the idea of a uniform dispensation and that the use of funds to support individuals with different needs could lead to a lowering of the overall basic income. Should BI correspond to differences between individuals?
  Van Parijs is one of those who asserts that it should, and what he proposes is "Undominated Diversity" (Van Parijs [1995] chapter three). ★01

 "This procedure comes to a rest as soon as, for each pair of comprehensive, that is, internal-cum-external, endowments, there is at least one person who prefers either endowment to the other." (Van Parijs [1995:74=2009:120])

  In this text what is being proposed is actually quite simple, although the way it is laid out may be difficult to understand for those not used to this sort of discussion. People's internal resources, such as talents and abilities, are "internal endowments" - they are not things which the individual creates by their own choosing and as such are not things for which they should bear responsibility. An individual may, for example, have internal endowments which cause them to be disliked by others (either a particular group of people or other people in general) and as a result be burdened with a disadvantage. Here the individual in question is given money (or material goods). These "external endowments" are combined with the individual's "internal endowments" and the result evaluated as their "comprehensive endowment". The amount to be paid to an individual is determined and paid out at the point that someone comes forward who concludes that they would not mind the disadvantage in question if they could get the amount of money provided and that the person in question might in fact be better off than other people. This is the kind of approach described.
  Since what is being imagined are situations that everyone wants very much to avoid, the amount of "external endowments" needed to get away from them would presumably be very large, and if this is the case then being in the situation would not be a bad thing because such a large dispensation could be obtained. There may indeed be some people who think this way. But many more people would presumably think something strange was happening here.
  The stipulation that if someone (one person) thinks that a condition which everyone accepts is not good (and therefore requires compensation in the form of an external endowment) would be acceptable given a certain level of dispensation is a strange one. Of course some people may harbor straightforward doubts about why only one person is needed to make this determination. Assuming that there is inequality if there exists a "person B who is unanimously seen as inferior to person A", there will presumably be those who do not understand why this situation becomes good (becomes one of equality) if "one person" does not think B is inferior to A. What I want to discuss here, however, is something slightly different.
  There are no doubt some who wonder why the issue of eye surgery is raised here. Surely it cannot be anything more than a single example of what is being discussed. But as a result of this surgery the negative "internal endowment" in question no longer exists. As I state later on, however, this sort of thing does not occur very often. Is it even appropriate as a simple example? It would seem that this sort of question has not been given much consideration. There are issues which raise doubts about how meaningful it is to examine this proposed approach. But it may be worthwhile to give some consideration to the question of why it seems strange. This line of thought may also be important in terms of its connection to certain kinds of intellectual traditions.

 ■2 Judgement is rendered by a stranger + it is not as though it is actually realized

  To begin with, this person is not the individual who actually possesses [internal endowment] B but is rather someone who imagines the state of affairs in question, considers what amount of compensation might make this hypothetical state of affairs acceptable, and performs a hypothetical calculation. Blindness itself, for example, as an internal endowment B is an intractable reality for the person who possesses it, but conversely cannot be a reality for people who do not possess it. The person in question is asked how much must be received given a state of blindness in order for it to be chosen [over sightedness without compensation]. Here there is one individual who has experienced endowment B and another individual who has instead experienced endowment A. It is difficult for either of them to be "at least one person who knows and understands all the consequences of having B rather than A"(Van Parijs[1995=2009:126]). In other words, the person who cannot see does not know what it is for condition B not to exist and the person who can see does not know what it is for condition B to exist. Both individuals are ignorant of one of the two (in the simplest case) states of affairs being compared. Of course, there are some individuals who could see in the past but have now lost their sight and may thus be able to compare both states of affairs. But most people lack this experience of both conditions. And the meaning of not being able to see for someone who could see in the past differs from the meaning of not being able to see for someone who has never had this ability. It is an internal endowment present only in a minority of the population, and as such is not normally (although there are exceptions) something understood by those in the majority. Understanding blindness is not as simple as closing one's eyes and imagining one cannot see.
  Of course, in practice there are many things we must choose without full understanding. There are cases in which we must choose from a set of options none of which we have so far experienced, and in such cases we use various techniques to imagine, compare and choose between possible future states of affairs. If we are less then perfectly informed about our options this is something which cannot be helped. But is this a good approach to take in addressing circumstances/differences which are both very important and difficult to estimate/imagine? If no other method is available this approach cannot be avoided. And if it can be used as a practical tool its use should be investigated. In any case doubts remain. I will return to this issue later.
  What is very important in relation to what I will discuss later is that when someone thinks they would accept the state of affairs in question, or when there is someone who says that, while they themselves might not wish to trade, with all of the external endowments provided the person in question is better off than another individual [who lacks the internal endowment in question], this is a "hypothetical" judgement, and neither the person in question nor anyone else is actually accepting being placed in the state of affairs in question.
  To begin with, this approach proposes that if some individual thinks they would accept the negative internal endowment in question given the amount of money on offer then the situation is fine, and here one may wonder if there is always such a person. Particularly when we consider a condition of severe illness, it seems unlikely that there would be someone who would accept this condition in exchange for some large amount of money. But there may indeed be, for example, someone who does not want to live a long life and would prefer a short life in which they had a lot of money at their disposal. Presumably in some cases such a person would exist and in others they would not. This is not the point I want to make here. [What I want to make clear is that] even when there is someone who would accept the illness in question it is not as though in practice they actually will. Even if they want to accept the illness [in exchange for compensation] they cannot. And it is not as though the person whose situation is being assessed could say that they would rather not take the money and have the person who says they would accept the state in question in exchange for the compensation on offer actually take on their illness. When it comes to internal endowments, no one actually does anything. All that is required of those involved is that they evaluate honestly.
  Why is this the case? The reason is simple. While the question being addressed is how to deal with internal endowments, these endowments themselves cannot be taken away or transferred to another individual. What those with a particular internal endowment are to receive is determined by discussions about whether or not their state of affairs would be acceptable if a certain amount of compensation were added, but the state of affairs being discussed is not one which is actually an object of acceptance or rejection. Should this be accepted as a valid approach?
  The idea of "preference" has received various criticisms, and one of these is how (from the outside) we are to understand what preferences are. One response to this criticism has been that we should simply look at what actually occurs; if someone chooses an orange over an apple we should say that they prefer oranges to apples. This is a fairly crude account but let us accept it for the moment. In the kind of situation we have been discussing, however, there are no actual occurrences to examine. This being the case, as we will see in the next section the problem of whether we should trust someone who says they would accept the state of affairs in question then arises. There is also the more fundamental problem of whether this method of dealing with this kind of situation ought to be employed. This is examined in the section after next.

 ■3 What sort of person's preferences are to be employed?

  One wonders if this sort of approach can actually be carried out. How is this process to proceed? Would everyone arrive at a price together, for example by having an individual's internal endowments appear on TV and their allotted money increased? This would be a two-way TV where viewers could push a button to signal when a sufficiently high dispensation had been reached. In this way the amount dispensed would be decided. Is this more or less how it would work? Here what first comes to mind, and this is something which can be said about all such methods, is that there are all sorts of people in the world.

 "In this light, let us first consider the objection that our criterion justifies far too little redistribution. It is enough for one queer fellow to consider blindness a blessing for compensation to the blind to cease to be required. To tackle this challenge, one should begin by stressing that the relevant preference schedules must be genuine and somehow available to the people concerned. " (Van Parijs[1995:77=2009:126])

  "queer fellows" are to be excluded. Van Parijs continues as follows.

 "It can only stop when it is true that at least one person who knows and understands all the consequences of having B rather than A judges in the light of her coonception of a good life that B is no worse than A. Some of the queer fellows one may have in mind can no doubt be disqualified on the ground that they do not understand what they are talking about. If any are left, they are likely to belong to isolated subsocieties, whose cultural world is unavailable to others (this is precisely why these regard them as queer), and hence whose preference schedules cannot be viewed as generally available. If these two conditions are met, that is, if there is no problem with either understanding or availability -- and if, therefore, there is no 'queerness' left -- there is nothing shocking, it seems to me, in discontinuing redistribution." (Van Parijs[1995:77=2009:126])

  There are people who " they are likely to belong to isolated subsocieties", and since these people are considered "queer" in the sense that they belong to a 部分社会 which other people do not understand their preferences are ignored. In a diverse society there are a variety of groups and individuals, and thus questions remain about which are to be considered "isolated subsocieties". It seems natural that there should be some people who have doubts about whether the passage quoted above provides an adequate standard.
  This is a problem which nearly always arises when this sort of argument is made. People's preferences are considered important so an effort is made not to alter or interfere with them. When this is done problems arise, and these preferences which lead to problematic states of affairs are then considered not to be preferences (within the normal range) or those who hold these preferences are not accepted as members of society capable of taking part in social decisions. This is also a logical inevitably. While considering people's opinions to be important, when unacceptable opinions arise they are not acknowledged as opinions. The person in question is excluded from the range of what are considered to be human beings★02.
  However, this approach - a result of an attempt to avoid things which are harsh or violent - can be seen as quite harsh and violent in its own right. And presumably there will be some preferences which are not sufficiently "queer" for us to exclude them even if we try. For example, there are some people who do not have a very strong desire to move around and go out of their homes. This is not a good thing, but neither is it particularly bad. It might not be normal, but it does not rise to the level of a difficult to understand deviancy; it is generally accepted that there are some people who do not like to go out. These people might not be troubled by having an "internal endowment" which makes moving around much more expensive for the person possessing it than for other people, and as a result might accept this condition with only a small increase in "external endowment" or even none at all. Not only in this case but in regard to most conditions, this sort of individual - one who is not to any great extent "abnormal" - seems likely to exist. If so, dispensation will presumably be lowered. Is this acceptable? If so, why?
  Next there is the question of whether or not the people who possess the internal endowment in question should participate in the evaluation. What is described is a situation in which a state of affairs no one would like to be placed in is not good, and a state of affairs in which at least one individual would not mind being placed (assuming they could receive the compensation on offer) is acceptable, and our first impression here is that this individual is not the person with the internal endowment in question. However, the person in question is not excluded in advance. The situation would therefore presumably be acceptable if the people in it themselves would not mind being placed in it [if given the choice]. And as people with experience of the situation in question these individuals could be seen as relatively well suited [to the task of evaluation].
  Among the people in question there are presumably some who are (fundamentally) hostile to their own state of affairs being viewed negatively and being compensated for with money. Such people would thus demand nothing and would ultimately not be able to receive anything. On the other hand, since the people in question could receive more just by saying the current level of compensation was insufficient, there may also be some who would demand a greater allotment of resources (although in doing so they would at the same time be lowering their "self evaluation"). These individuals might thus be excluded [from the evaluation process] for having these sorts of [personal] interests.
  Are those who lack the internal endowment in question then suitable? Presumably the less external endowments allotted the less they themselves will have to contribute. And the less funds they assign to this kind of compensation the more money will circulate as BI. This being the case they may seek to reduce the amount of this added allotment. Those who do this sort of thing intentionally might be excluded from participation. However, there would doubtless also be cases where this kind of self-awareness is lacking. And as I mentioned earlier, what is being considered is ultimately an imaginary situation; in reality internal endowments are neither taken on nor taken away, and regarding both those who have the internal endowment themselves and those who do not there is no way of being sure (for both the individuals themselves and others) that their decision is "genuine".

 ■4 What is (should be) done usaully ?

  People are said to suffer a loss for not being able to see, for example, or for not being attractive, but what should these people who bear a disadvantage due this kind of negative "internal endowment" B be expected to do? What is to be done by society, or in more concrete terms by the government? Dispensation will be made. But what exactly is the nature of this dispensation to be? What does it mean for some amount to be paid? Each individual is different, and one can imagine it being strange or uncomfortable to be the object of a welfare benefit/compensation which lumps everyone together without regard for these differences.
  For example, there are people with life threatening illnesses - these too are internal endowments. According to the proposal described here, the amount of money to be paid to the person in question is determined by the point at which someone who would accept their circumstances given the amount offered comes forward. To begin with, there are cases where it would seem unlikely that any such person would exist. As was mentioned earlier, however, there may indeed be some individuals who would accept dying in a short period of time if they could receive a lot of money to use in the time remaining to them. In the end, however, this is an imagined transaction. The illness in question is not in fact accepted or taken away from the person who is actually unwell. On the basis of an imaginary calculation the person in question is paid some fixed amount determined by the point at which there is someone who would accept a state of affairs in which, for example, they would die in a month (either if measures to save them are not taken or even if all treatments are attempted) but would be free to use the amount of money offered for themselves or for some other person in whatever way they wanted. This would seem to differ from what most people think should or must be done. We presumably think that, while feeling sadness over the fact that the person in question's illness cannot be cured and if things continue on their present course they will suffer and ultimately die, what we should do, what little we can do, is provide medical treatment and nursing care (even if a cure is impossible) and provide the person in question a place to live out the remainder of their life. All we can do is provide the money needed for these purposes, but we can at least do this. We do in fact do this. What is strange is that it is not thought about it in this way.
  Assuming the internal endowment in question is indeed a negative state of affairs, where then does this negative state of affairs come from and what exactly is it? The difficulties in the life of the person in question are composed of several elements. Individuals suffer disadvantages in relation to their internal endowments in connection with the relationship between these endowments and other people. And while there may be some situations where it is possible or easy to change this state of affairs there are no doubt also cases where this is difficult or impossible. What can be changed and what cannot?
  Here there are five - more if finer distinctions are drawn - situations which arise and things which are/cannot be addressed. 1) The internal endowment is removed, for example through medical treatment. In some cases this is cannot be achieved. 2) The various disadvantages that arise where the internal endowment and society interact can be compensated for and this compensation is carried out. In some cases this is difficult. 3) The negative internal endowment is something given by other people (or not taken away even though a policy could be taken which would allow it to be). In some cases at the same time but nevertheless as a distinct phenomenon 4) a negative value is attached to the internal endowment. Regarding instances of 3) and 4) there have been protests, criticism, and demands for cessation, and where the actions in question have already occurred there have been demands for retraction, assignation of blame and calls for the punishment of those involved. In some of these cases "reparations" and "compensation" have been demanded and justified. There are also 5) situations in which regarding their internal endowments and relationship with others an individual finds some part of what occurs within them sad or unfortunate but considers the situation unavoidable and does nothing to change it.
  There are also cases where several of these situations arise at the same time regarding the same internal endowment. For example, while 3) harm done by artificial means (human action) may be criticized, at the same time 4) the contempt for the state in question which exists in society may be opposed, 1) medical treatment may be sought, and where this treatment is not successful 2) assistance may be demanded for those whose lives have been made more difficult.
  1) To begin with, what this book takes as an example of this is, as was mentioned in the passage quoted above, an operation which costs money and restores sight. In this case, assuming the operation is a success, since the disability/internal endowment is removed a benefit can be attained just by spending money. The person in question is ill, and this illness can be cured by providing sufficient funds. In this case the point of spending money, its use and effectiveness can all be understood. In most cases, however, one of the distinctive characteristics of internal endowments is that they themselves cannot be removed. This is why, as I mentioned earlier, it seems strange to use this kind of eye surgery as an example.
  In short, there are cases in which removal [of the internal endowment] from the body in question is impossible and such cases are common. Here internal endowments are things which cannot (easily) be taken away. They cause suffering and death. It would seem that when undominated diversity is argued for this sort of situation is not what is being considered. But these too are internal endowments. What is to be done in such cases? Nothing can be done about the state [of the internal endowment] itself. It is not as though anything can be done about this state of affairs which cannot be taken away or exchanged by distributing funds based on someone saying they would change places (take on the internal endowment in question) in exchange for some fixed amount of compensation. Of course, being given money (or other resources) is a good thing for most people, and in most cases the person in question would likely accept it. Depending on the individual this offer may also incite anger. There may be some who would reject it.
  2) Even in cases where pain and death cannot ultimately be avoided, however, most of the time there are still things which can be done for the person in question. Regarding disabilities, related difficulties and inconveniences can be compensated for either completely or in part. Supplementary income can be given to make up for what the individual cannot earn in the market. Of course this is also true of most aspects of illnesses; to put it another way, most people suffering from illnesses possess a disability in terms of their capacity to lead their daily lives.
  There are two ways of providing services to address this. One involves paying a stipend or providing material goods to each individual separately. Most social services such as medical treatment and living assistance are provided in this way. The other involves policies to make the environment better suited to the people in question by improving the design of things like streets and buildings. ★03
  Regarding disparity in internal endowments, this is basically what has been demanded by social movements and activism on the part of the people in question and which in some cases has been implemented as social policy. The standards/methods described as undominated diversity in fact differ from what [this movement] has sought to realize. To begin with, according to this method supplemental assistance stops at the point someone appears who says they would accept the situation in question. There are no doubt some people who have no interest in leaving their homes and various other activities, and this is fine. They are not to be excluded as being abnormal. If this is the case, the point at which this sort of person says assistance is sufficient is the point at which the limit of assistance provided is set. In other words, assistance is extended no further than the point at which the person who gives the lowest estimate of the hardships and inconveniences to be remedied deems it sufficient. Those who find this worrying cannot help but criticize this approach.
  So what is demanded instead? Broadly speaking there are two things which are sought here. One is "what can normally be done", and the costs needed to achieve this, through a variety of methods, being born by society. There are some people who need assistance in order to eat and others who do not. Here the very simple demand is that the former be provided funds to cover the costs incurred. The other thing sought is a guaranteed income. The people in question cannot earn sufficiently in the market. A supplement is sought to make up for this deficiency of earnings. It therefore seems strange that the provision of BI and the addressing of internal endowments have been separated from each other. This is something I will address in my next article.
  There have also been choices made between 1) and 2) and disputes surrounding this issue. For the most part disabled people (and disability studies) have emphasized 2). This has not been because they have denied or wanted to deny internal endowments which are seen as negative themselves. It has come from the idea that what does not heal does not heal, and if nonetheless the cost of correcting the situation is calculated, and 1) is spoken about positively while 2) is not, this is not fair or just★04.
  What is in fact strange is why "undominatedness and plurality" must be employed and not this approach. I cannot understand the reason for this. Is it because regarding this kind of dispensation the question of what it is to be provided for must be addressed and there are concerns about interfering in the particulars of people's lives? Questions such as whether to accomodate the desire of a person who cannot walk to climb mount Everest may arise, and a line must be drawn between requests which are to be accommodated and those which are not. This is not good. Is this the reason ["undominated diversity" is employed]? Even if there is no single definitive solution to this problem, however, this is not something which should lead to a withdrawal from this area. From a practical point of view we ought to be able to say that what is being realized regarding "normal people" is presumably what ought to be realized and leave the consideration of anything above and beyond this for later★05. All that is being claimed here is that there are instances where individuals require assistance from others, and in some cases the costs incurred are much greater than those born by other people. If nothing is done about this the resulting situation is not desirable from the point of view of "real freedom". Therefore compensation for these extra costs must and should be given. This approach is not taken, however, and what is employed instead are the preferences of a single individual who does not care very much about the disadvantages in question.
  Furthermore, what is at issue and what is being demanded here is fundamentally nothing more than something provided as a means. It is asserted that there are various sides to the relationship between internal endowments and society, that each of these should be taken for what it is and dealt with accordingly, and that we should begin by picking out things which cause hardship in daily life and providing compensation regarding only these situations. The proposed undominated diversity approach, on the other hand, involves everything related to the internal endowment being evaluated. If we think we ought to be cautious about evaluating or interfering with a person's way of being in its entirety, which approach is more desirable?
  4) 5) There are problems regarding the creation of these disadvantages and their elimination has been sought. 4) There are illnesses, such as those brought about by pollution, which are caused by what has been done (or should have been done but was not) by an individual or individuals. These are undoubtedly internal endowments, even though they are internal endowments bestowed by industry through criminal actions. Also, in some cases 5) regardless of whether or not an internal endowment is itself caused by human activity the internal endowment in question is given a negative value (in some cases this is communicated to the people in question), and they are then attacked either directly or indirectly.
  These two sorts of situation are not the same, and attention must be paid to their differences, but one point they have in common is that in both cases the harm in question is caused by human beings, and therefore let us assume that if this not something which is to be justified or permitted it is correct to prohibit and criticize it. Regarding damage which has already been done, presumably there will be demands for accountability and a reforming of the attitude of those at fault. There will probably also be some people who are punished. Part of this may include the payment of compensation.
  However, the approach endorsed under the phrase "undominated diversity", read literally, takes the problematic part of the situation in question as a given and then attempts to "compensate" on top of it with something different. Even though the thing in question itself is the problem, this approach leaves it as it is and attempts to balance out what losses it engenders through the provision of something else.
  So what is it about this that causes feelings of opposition? One point which may be raised, as was discussed earlier, is the use of a person who has (been thought to have) come forward and said they would endure the state of affairs in question given the amount of money on offer as the standard which determines at which point no further assistance is provided. But this is not the only source of resistance to this approach. Another cause of opposition is the sense that what should or must be done is something fundamentally different. What is being sought is not some amount of extra benefits in exchange for enduring the condition in question, but rather a change in that condition itself, and, if there was harm caused by human action, the calling to account of those responsible. Still another cause of resistance to this approach is that even in cases where a particular individual or group of individuals was responsible for causing the damage in question, here the external endowments awarded are taken from society as a whole. This is seen as wrong. Even if the harm is caused by all members of society, an assigning of blame to the whole of society may indeed be sought but this would not entail only providing something extra up to the point that someone would accept the condition in question. Let us accept it as a fact that discrimination and prejudice will not go away despite their being denounced and criticized and various forms of enlightenment and education being carried out. Here it is presumably right that some sort of compensation be sought. Also, since people will want to avoid having to pay this kind of compensation, this may have the further effect of reducing harmful actions. There are still things which cannot be compensated for by other means, however, and instances where the individual in question is not happy with their situation even if compensation is paid.
  Of course, those who argue for undominated diversity do not presumably reject the acts of punishing those who cause harm or attempting to prevent harm themselves. If asked they may respond that crimes should be dealt with as crimes independently of this scheme of internal endowments + external endowments → comprehensive endowments.
  But there are cases where what occurs is not a clear crime of the sort covered by criminal law. An individual's life may be made difficult, for example, by prejudice/contempt related to one of their internal endowments. This hardship should be eliminated, and where elimination is impossible it should be reduced. There are presumably cases where it is impossible and/or wrong to deal with this through the distribution of resources. Here the reply may be that while the need for other ways of dealing with some situations is accepted these other approaches are simply not being discussed in the proposal in question. But this is where the problem lies. No distinction is drawn. As a result there is no indication of what would occasion a departure from the process of simply dealing with negative internal endowments through the provision of external endowments.
  The problem which actually exists is that, on the contrary, since there is no choice but to seek 1) medical treatment and 2) income required to survive, the pursuit of responsibility and demands for punishment must be abandoned and a compromise reached with those who have caused the harm in question out of necessity. Also, since the pursuit of accountability and demands for punishment can only be realized in terms of financial compensation there may be suspicions that victims exaggerate in their reporting of the damage they have received★05. It is therefore desirable that the condemnation of those who cause harm and demands for their accountability be distinguished from the provision of treatment and income required to survive and each pursued separately. For this reason too what must be distinguished must be distinguished.
  5) There is also happiness/unhappiness which arises through the relationship between an individual's internal endowments and the people around them, and regarding this happiness/unhappiness disparities remain. Say for example that I am very unhappy because a certain individual does not like me. This seems to be because of something within me (even if I cannot define exactly what it is) which I cannot change, and if so this dislike is related to my internal endowments. As a result I may suffer disadvantages due to the preferences of other people or a particular individual. In other words the desire of the individual in question to be liked by a particular individual cannot be realized. This is the result not of things decided by the person in question but of things they cannot change or eliminate; they are not liked because of things they cannot do anything about and for which they do not bear any responsibility. Since they suffer a disadvantage for which they themselves are not responsible, according to the principle of undominated diversity they become targets of compensation.
  Regarding some of these [causes of unhappiness] we may be able to offer criticism, assign blame, and demand change. There may be problems concerning those which occur within "private relationships" and therefore about which it is said these sorts of things cannot or must not be done, but under the slogan of "what is individual is societal" action has been taken regarding even these sorts of issues. But there still remain some instances in which, due to the very meaning of what is being sought. one cannot demand a change in the other party's treatment of oneself. There are cases where demanding such a change can cause the other party to obey one's wishes, but there are also cases where one must refrain from making such demands because to do so would deny the other as a being which does not always adhere to one's own will and thereby deprive oneself of the meaning of the other. This follows from the essential nature of this relationship [between self and other]. (See Tateiwa [1997] chapter four, chapter eight section five "Discrimination caused by the other being the other").
  Here there are not likely to be many calls for government intervention/interference. It seems impossible to compel through force the provision of something which is not there in the first place, and [even if it were possible] it would presumably not be thought of as a good thing. Also, regarding this sad state of affairs I am in, I would presumably not seek some extra compensation to supplement my condition determined by the amount required for some individual to come forward and say they would trade places with me. I would presumably not be seeking economic benefits.
  Here, too, proponents of undominated diversity may accept the above as obviously true and reply that it lies outside the scope of what they are proposing. This is unmistakably a question of "internal endowments", however, and the endowments in question meet the condition of not being the responsibility of the person in question required for the receiving of benefits. They therefore ought fundamentally to be included in this scheme, and an example of this sort of situation is indeed cited at the beginning of this chapter.

 ■5 Why does this occur (not occur)?

  Throughout the world there have been a variety of different ways of thinking regarding how to deal with the differences between individuals here referred to as internal endowments. There has not been a single definition of what is a good or correct course of action, but rather numerous independent actions which are each on their own straightforward and appropriate. We have seen this in what has been discussed so far. Why is this issue not thought of in this way? I do not intuitively understand the answer to this question. Here what I (we) want to say is not that the approach being proposed "lacks consideration for people who are weak and vulnerable". On the contrary, in most cases its proponents are sufficiently sympathetic to "the vulnerable". And they are trying to act conscientiously. But while this is understood a feeling that there is something fundamentally strange about this approach persists. Why is this kind of argument put forward in this way? The answer is perhaps related to something bigger than its simply being connected to BI or the nature of those who write about BI. I will discuss this further in my next article.


★01  I do not think this proposal has been seriously examined in the Japanese literature. It has been introduced in several examinations of Van Parijs' various ideas and assertions. Few references to it have been critical. The connotations of this concept in the field of economics are discussed in Yoshihara and Goto[2004] and Yoshihara[2007]. It is also examined in Murakami [2006] [2008a] and [2008b]. Here this proposal is briefly introduced and some simple problems regarding it described in a passage which goes on to focus on "capability" - no objections are raised regarding this broadly defined line of thought. Okabe [2008] includes a citation of Murakami's presentation of this approach. The following quotation [originally in Japanese] is taken from comments by the translator of Van Parijs' text:
  "Broadly speaking, this standard amounts to the idea that if in a given society there is no person B who is universally seen as inferior to person A then "equality" between individuals has been attained." (Saito [2009:403])
★02 Kitada [2003] addresses this problem. For my comments on this text see Tateiwa [2004b].
★03 The taking of the following sort of approach is accepted:
  "…………"(Van Parijs[1995=2009:137], note 45)
  This passage is also quoted in Saito [2009:404], and the author goes on to say that Van Parijs is seeking the provision of a BI as a feasible means of attaining the satisfaction of everyone's basic needs, indicating that he acknowledges that the meaning of this approach is not the distribution of money but the provision of material goods.
★04   The need to look at the plusses and minuses of the kind of healing or correction found in 1) for both the person in question and those around them is discussed in Tateiwa [2001]. In Tateiwa [2002] it is pointed out that when comparing 1) and 2) there are cases where 2) is preferable for the person in question but not for the people around them.
★05 What is referred to as "adaptive preference formation" is examined in Tateiwa [2004a].
★06  "Those who have caused death or pain or hardship deserve to be condemned. These people should be pursued. But, first, if in order to do this there is a need to bring forward the unhappiness they have caused, this may be seen as an affront to those who have been harmed. It is for this reason one may come to the conclusion it is better not to do this." (Tateiwa [2008a])


石川 准・倉本 智明 編 2002 『障害学の主張』,明石書店
北田 暁大 2003 『責任と正義――リベラリズムの居場所』,勁草書房
村上 慎司Murakami, Shinji) 2006 「優越なき多様性について(On undominated diversity)」,Workshop with Professor Philippe Van Parij,於:立命館大学衣笠キャンパス→2007 報告書
――――― 2008a 「ベーシック・インカムと衡平性――Philippe Van Prijsの議論を中心に」,第2回ベーシックインカム日本ネットワーク準備委員会,於:同志社大学
――――― 2008b 「福祉政策と厚生経済学の架橋についての試論」,『経済政策ジャーナル』5-2:55-58(日本経済政策学会)
野口 裕二・大村 英昭 編 2001 『臨床社会学の実践』,有斐閣
岡部 耕典 2008 「関係性構築の消費/自由を担保する所得――ダイレクトペイメントとベーシックインカム」,経済と障害の研究(READ)プロジェクト研究会 http://www.eft.gr.jp/money/080927DP&BI_READ-ken.doc
齊藤 拓 2009 「訳者解説」,Van Parijs[1995=2009:307-434]
立岩 真也 1997 『私的所有論』,勁草書房(On Private Property(Shiteki-Shoyu Ron), Tokyo, Keiso-Shobo)
――――― 2001 「なおすことについて」,野口・大村編[2001:171-196]
――――― 2002 「ないにこしたことはない,か・1」,石川・倉本編[2002:]
――――― 2004a 『自由の平等――簡単で別な姿の世界』,岩波書店 (Equality of Freedom: An Another Simple World(Jiyu no Byodou), Tokyo, Iwanami-Shoten)
――――― 2004b 「北田暁大『責任と正義――リベラリズムの居場所』について」,現代倫理学研究会 於:専修大学
――――― 2008a 「争いと争いの研究について」,山本・北村編[2008:163-177]
――――― 2008b 『良い死』,筑摩書房(Good Death (?) (Yoi Shi), Tokyo, Chikuma-Shobo
Van Parijs, Philippe 1995 Real Freedom for All-What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford University Press=20090610 後藤 玲子齊藤 拓 訳,『ベーシック・インカムの哲学――すべての人にリアルな自由を』,勁草書房,494p. ISBN-10: 4326101830 ISBN-13: 978-4326101832 \6000 [amazon][kinokuniya] ※
山本 崇記・北村 健太郎 編 2008 『不和に就て――医療裁判×性同一性障害/身体×社会』,生存学研究センター報告3
吉原 直毅 20070418 「ワークフェア(Workfare)とベーシックインカム(Basic Income)」http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~yosihara/rousou/ronsou-13.htm
吉原 直毅・後藤 玲子Goto, Reiko) 200407 「「基本所得」政策の規範的経済理論――「福祉国家」政策の厚生経済学序説」,『経済研究』55-3:230-244 http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~yosihara/ronsou-9fukusikokkaseisaku.pdf

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