ロチェスター大学経済学部教授。専門は社会的選択理論、ゲーム理論。交渉解における公理的分析、
無羨望としての衡平性に関する分析で世界的に名を知られる研究者である。Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 2
に所収される予定の論文“Fair Allocation Rules”
は、公平な資源配分ルールに関する経済分析の現時点で最も優れた展望論文である。
◆学歴
1972 Diplome d'Ingenieur de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, France
1976 Ph.D. in Economics, Stanford University
◆職歴
1976-1980 Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Assistant Professor
1980-1983 Department of Economics, Harvard University, Visiting Lecturer
1982 (September) Nagoya City University, Visiting Lecturer
1982-1983 Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Associate Professor
1983 (June) Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Institute for Advanced Studies, Visiting Fellow
1983-1985 Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Associate Professor
1984 (June) Universite d'Aix-Marseille and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Directeur d'Etudes
1985-present Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Professor
1986 (May) Universite de Rennes, France, Visiting Professor
1993 (June): Delta, Paris, France
1997 (May) Universite de Cergy-Pontoise, France, Visiting Professor
1997 (June) Universite de Caen, France, Visiting Professor
1998 (June) Universite de Caen, France, Visiting Professor
1999 (Spring semester) Harvard University, Visiting Professor
1999 (June) Universite de Caen, France, Visiting Professor
2000 (May) Universite de Caen, France, Visiting Professor
2005 (June) Paris School of Economics, France, Visiting Professor
■編書
◆Thomson, W.L. [ed.], (2008), The Economics of Fairness, Edward Elgar, forthcoming.
◆Thomson, W.L. [ed.], (2008), Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond, Edward Elgar, forthcoming.
■共著
◆Lensberg, T; Thomson, W.L. (1989), Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents, Cambridge University Press, ISBN:0521027039 US$39.99
［amazon］
■単著
◆Thomson, W.L. (2001), A Guide for the Young Economist, MIT Press, ISBN:0262700794 US$20.00
［amazon］
（＝清野 一治訳『経済論文の書き方――作成・プレゼン・評価』東洋経済新報社,ISBN:4492313621 ［amazon］ ）
◆Thomson, W.L. (2008), Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach, Academic Press, forthcoming.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2008), The Theory of Fair Allocation, Princeton University Press, forthcoming.
■主要論文
◆Thomson, W.L. (1979), “Maximin Strategies and Elicitation of Preferences,” in J.-J. Laffont, [ed.], Revelation of Preferences, North-Holland.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1979), “Eliciting Production Possibilities from a Well-Informed Manager,” Journal of Economic Theory, 20: 360-380.
◆Myerson, R.B.; Thomson, W.L. (1980), “Monotonicity and Independence Axioms,” International Journal of Game Theory, 9: 37-49.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1981), “Nash's Bargaining Solution and Utilitarian Choice Rules,” Econometrica, 49: 535-538.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1981), “Independence of Irrelevant Expansions,” International Journal of Game Theory, 10: 107-114.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1981), “A Class of Solutions to Bargaining Problems,” Journal of Economic Theory, 25: 431-441.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1982), “An Informationally Efficient Equity Criterion,” Journal of Public Economics, 18: 243-263.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1983), “Equity in Exchange Economies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 29: 217-244.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1983), “The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply among a Growing Population,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 8: 319-326.
◆Lensberg, T; Thomson, W.L. (1983), “Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 3: 205-218.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1983), “Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Principle,” Journal of Economic Theory, 31: 211-226.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1984), “Truncated Egalitarian Solutions,” Social Choice and Welfare, 1: 25-32.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1984), “The Manipulability of Resource-Allocation Mechanisms,” Review of Economic Studies, 51: 447-460.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1984), “Monotonicity, Stability and Egalitarianism,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 8: 15-18.
◆Thomson, W.L.; Varian, H.L. (1985), “Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry,” in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein, [eds.],
Social Goals and Social Organization: Volume in Memory of E. Pazner, Cambridge University Press
◆Thomson, W.L. (1986), “Replication Invariance of Bargaining Solutions,” International Journal of Game Theory, 15: 59-63.
◆Chichilnisky, G.; Thomson, W.L. (1987), “The Walrasian Mechanism from Equal Division Is not Monotonic with Respect to Variations in the Number of Consumers,” Journal of Public Economics, 32: 119-124.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1987), “Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point,” Journal of Economic Theory, 42: 50-58.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1987), “The Vulnerability to Manipulative Behavior of Economic Mechanisms Designed to Select Equitable and Efficient Outcomes,” in
T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, [eds.], Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms, University of Minnesota Press.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1987), “Individual and Collective Opportunities,” International Journal of Game Theory, 16: 245-252.
◆Chun, Y.; Thomson, W.L. (1988), “Monotonicity Properties of Bargaining Solutions When Applied to Economics,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 15: 1-27.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1988), “The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value,” International Journal of Game Theory, 17: 101-127.
◆Lensberg, T.; Thomson, W.L. (1988), “Characterizing the Nash Bargaining Solution without Pareto-Optimality,” Social Choice and Welfare, 5: 247-259.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1988), “A Study of Choice Correspondences in Economies with a Variable Number of Agents,” Journal of Economic Theory, 46: 237-254.
◆Moulin, H.; Thomson, W.L. (1988), “Can Everyone Benefit from Growth? Two Difficulties,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 17: 339-345.
◆Diamantaras, D.; Thomson, W.L. (1990), “A Refinement and Extension of the No-Envy Concept,” Economics Letters, 33: 217-222.
◆Chun, Y.; Thomson, W.L. (1990), “Bargaining Problems with Uncertain Disagreement Points,” Econometrica, 58: 951-959.
◆Chun, Y.; Thomson, W.L. (1990), “Nash Solution and Uncertain Disagreement Points,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2: 213-223.
◆Tadenuma, K.; Thomson, W.L. (1991), “No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods,” Econometrica, 59: 1755-1767.
◆Chun, Y.; Thomson, W.L. (1992), “Bargaining Problems with Claims,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 24: 19-33.
◆Berliant, M.; Dunz, K.; Thomson, W.L. (1992), “On the Fair Division of a Heterogeneous Commodity,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21: 201-216.
◆Tadenuma, K.; Thomson, W.L. (1993), “The Fair Allocation of an Indivisible Good when Monetary Compensations are Possible,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 25: 117-132.
◆Thomson, W.L.; Zhou, L. (1993), “Consistent Allocation Rules in Atomless Economies,” Econometrica, 61: 575-587.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1994), “Notions of Equal, or Equivalent, Opportunities,” Social Choice and Welfare, 11: 137-156.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1994), “Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked,” Social Choice and Welfare, 11: 205-223.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1994), “Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked,” Journal of Economic Theory, 63: 219-245.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1994), “Consistent Extensions,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 28: 35-49.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1994), “Cooperative Models of Bargaining,” in R. Aumann and S. Hart, [eds.], Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, North-Holland.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1995), “Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked,” Economic Theory, 5: 229-246.
◆Tadenuma, K.; Thomson, W.L. (1995), “Refinements of the No-Envy Solution in Economies with Indivisible Goods,” Theory and Decision, 39: 189-206.
◆Tadenuma, K.; Thomson, W.L. (1995), “Games of Fair Division,” Games and Economic Behavior, 9: 191-204.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1997), “Cooperative Theory of Bargaining: The Classical Model,” in S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, [eds.], Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approach, Springer-Verlag.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1997), “Cooperative Theory of Bargaining: Modern Developments,” in S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, [eds.], Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approach, Springer-Verlag.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1997), “The Replacement Principle in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory, 76: 145-168.
◆Moulin, H.; Thomson, W.L. (1997), “Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation,” in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura, [eds.], Social Choice Re-Examined, McMillan.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1998), “The Replacement Principle in Economies with Indivisible Goods,” Social Choice and Welfare, 15: 57-66.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1999), “Monotonic Extensions on Economic Domains,” Review of Economic Design, 4: 13-33.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1999), “Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1: 139-176.
◆Thomson, W.L. (1999), “Welfare-Domination under Preference-Replacement: A Survey and Open Questions,” Social Choice and Welfare, 16: 373-394.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2001), “On the Axiomatic Method and Its Recent Applications to Game Theory and Resource Allocation,” Social Choice and Welfare, 18: 327-387.
◆Chambers, C.; Thomson, W.L. (2002), “Group Order Preservation and the Proportional Rule for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 44: 235-252.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2002), “Nash Bargaining Theory: Fifty Years Later,” in C. Kottaridi and G. Siourounis, [eds.], Game Theory: A Festschrift in Honor of John Nash, University of Athens.
◆Hokari, T.; Thomson, W.L. (2003), “Claims Problems and Weighted Generalizations of the Talmud Rule,” Economic Theory, 21: 241-261.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2003), “Axiomatic and Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bankruptcy and Taxation Problems: A Survey,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 45: 249-297.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2003), “On Monotonicity in Economies with Indivisible Goods,” Social Choice and Welfare, 21: 195-205.
◆Chun, Y.; Thomson, W.L. (2005), “Convergence under Replication of Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims,” Games and Economic Behavior, 50: 129-142.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2005), “Divide-and-Permute,” Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200.
◆Dominguez, D.; Thomson, W.L. (2006), “A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims,” Economic Theory, 28: 283-307.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2007), “Children Crying at Birthday Parties: Why?,” Economic Theory, 31: 501-521.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2007), “On the Existence of Consistent Rules to Resolve Conflicting Claims: A Geometric Approach,” Review of Economic Design, 11: 225-251.
◆Hokari, T.; Thomson, W.L. (2008), “On Properties of Division Rules Lifted by Bilateral Consistency,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, forthcoming.
◆Chun-Hsien Y.; Thomson, W.L. (2008), “Operators for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims,” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2008), “Two Families of Rules for the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims,” Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
◆Ching, S.; Thomson, W.L. (2008), “Population-Monotonic Solutions in Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences,” Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
◆Thomson, W.L. (2008), “Fair Allocation Rules,” in K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura, [eds.], Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.2, North-Holland, forthcoming.
＊作成：坂本徳仁