Thomson, Judith J.


◆Thomson, Judith J. 1971 "A Defense of Abortion", Philosophy & Public Affairs 1-1:47-66=1988 Kato ; Iida eds. [1988:82-93] <362>

◆立岩 真也 1997/09/05 『私的所有論』,勁草書房,445+66p. ISBN-10: 4326601175 ISBN-13: 978-4326601172 6300 [amazon][kinokuniya] ※
◆立岩 真也 2013/05/20 『私的所有論 第2版』,生活書院・文庫版,973p. ISBN-10: 4865000062 ISBN-13: 978-4865000061 1800+ [amazon][kinokuniya] ※
Tateiwa, Shinya(立岩 真也) 2016 On Private Property, English Version, Kyoto Books

 chap.5 note 20
Thomson [1971]. This is argued in Feinberg [1980] and cited in Brody [19751983], Inoue [1987:59-611996:21-23], Iida [19891994:128-129], and Nagata [1995a:151-152].
"Thomson's argument rests on several unproven premises: 1) A mother's body is an object to which rights of private ownership apply. 2) The owner of a mother's body is the 'mother' and not the fetus. 3) A 'mother' bears a special responsibility for a fetus only in cases in which she gives at least tacit approval to the use of her body by the fetus in question. Even if it is acknowledged that there are limits to the right to life, it is not clear that these limits should be as restrictive as Thomson argues.
However, even if this point is accepted, the overturning of any of the closely intertwined premises ((1)-3)) listed above would result in the failure of her argument. I do not have space to get into this here, but any of these three premises could be subject to debate." (Inoue [1987:601996:21-22]).
"...J Feinberg makes a very detailed argument against Thomson from the perspective of a woman's responsibility in relation to pregnancy." (Iida [19891994:128]).
"...changing the question from 'whether or not the woman in question has the right to kill her fetus' to 'whether or not the woman in question has an obligation to continue to carry the fetus within her body' allows us to avoid the question of whether or not a fetus is a person. This is an example of a successful rearranging of concepts." (Nagata [1995a:152])
My opinion is close to the first two given above. Engelhardt [1986] (cited in Hisatake Kato [1989b:584-585] [1992:96-97]) also asserts that a fetus is the property of the woman who is carrying it.

 「◆20 Thomson[1971=1988]。Feinberg[1980=1988]がこれを論じ、Brody[1975→1983=1988:173-176]、井上達夫[1987:59-61→1996:21-23]、飯田亘之[1989→1994:128-129]、永田えり子[1995a:151-152]が言及している。
 「トムソンのこの議論は、論証されていないいくつかの前提に決定的に依存している。すなわち、1)母体▽363 は私的所有権の対象である。2)母体の所有者は「母」であって胎児ではない。3)「母」が胎児に特別の責任を負うのは、彼女が胎児による彼女の体の使用を少なくとも黙示的に許可した場合のみである。生命権が限界をもつのは認められるとしても、それがトムソンの説くほど制限的か否かは疑問である。/しかし、この点を仮に認めたとしても、相互に密接に関連する三つの前提1)−3)がくずれるならば彼女の議論は破綻する。ここで立ち入って検討する余裕はないが、この三つの前提はいずれも論議の対象となりうるものである。」(井上[1987:60→1996:21-22])

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