HOME > WHO >

Strathern Marilyn

マリリン・ストラサーン


last update:201009

■研究テーマ

人類学/知的所有権/メラネシア/生殖技術

■編著

◆1988 The gender of the gift: problems with women and problems with society in Melanesia
◆1992 After nature: English kinship in the late twentieth century,Cambridge University Press.
◆1992 Reproducing the future: essays on anthropology, kinship and the new reproductive technologies
◆1999 Property, substance and effect. Anthropological essays on persons and things, London: Athlone Press. [Collected essays, 1992-98]
◆2000 (ed) Audit Cultures. Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy, London: Routledge.
◆With Eric Hirsch (joint editors) 2004 Transactions and creations: property debates and the stimulus of Melanesia, Oxford: Berghahn.
◆2004 Commons and borderlands: Working papers on interdisciplinarity, accountability and the flow of knowledge, Wantage: Sean Kingston Publishing.
◆2005 Kinship, law and the unexpected: Relatives are often a surprise, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■論文

◆2009 'Using bodies to communicate' in Lambert,H and McDonard,M(eds) Social Bodies, Berghahn Book.148-167
◆2006 'A community of critics? Thoughts on new knowledge', Jornal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, (NS) 12, 191-209. [Huxley Memorial Lecture]
◆2006 'Bulletproofing. A tale from the UK'. In A Riles (ed), Documents: Artifacts of modern knowledge, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

◆2006 'Protecting channels of communication: Some challenges from the Pacific'. In F Macmillan (ed), New directions in copyright law, vol 2, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

◆2006 'Divided origins and the arithmetic of ownership'. In B Maurer and G Schwab (eds), Accelerating possession: Global futures of property and personhood, New York: Columbia University Press. [Earlier version of chapter 6, Kinship, Law and the Unexpected]

◆2006 'Intellectual property and rights: an anthropological perspective'. In C Tilley et al (eds), Handbook of material culture, London: Sage Publications.

◆2005 'Resistance, refusal and global moralities', Australian Feminist Studies, 20: 181-93.
◆2005 'Robust knowledge and fragile futures'. In A Ong and S Collier (eds), Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as anthropological problems, New York: Blackwell Publishing.

◆2005 'Imagined collectitives and multiple authorship'. In R Ghosh (ed), Code: Collaborative ownership and the digital economy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

◆2005 'Emblems, ornaments and inversions of value', epilogue to S Ku"chler and G Were (eds), The art of clothing: A Pacific experience, London: UCL Press.
◆2005 'Imagined collectivities and multiple authorship'. In R Ghosh (ed), Code: Collaborative ownership and the digital economy, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
◆2004 'Losing (out on) intellectual resources'. In A Pottage & M Mundy (eds), Law, anthropology, and the constitution of the social: Making persons and things, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
◆2004 'The whole person and its artefacts', Annual Review of Anthropology, 33: 1-19.
◆2004 'Knowledge on its travels: Accountability across disciplines'. In M Strathern, Commons and borderlands, Wantage: Sean Kingston Publishing.
◆2004 'Transactions: an analytical foray'. In E Hirsch and M Strathern (eds), Transactions and creations: property debates and the stimulus of Melanesia, Oxford: Berghahn.
◆2004 'Social property: an interdisciplinary experiment', PoLAR (Political and Legal Anthropology Review), 27: 33-50.
◆2004 'Laudable aims and problematic consequences, or: The 'flow' of knowledge is not neutral, Economy and Society (spec. iss., J Squires ed.), 33: 550-61.
◆2004 'Social property: an interdisciplinary experiment', PoLAR (Political and Legal Anthropology Review), 27: 33-50. Abridged as Experiments in interdisciplinarity, Social Anthropology, 13: 75-90,
◆2002 'On space and depth'. In J Law & A-M Mol (eds), Complexities: Social studies of knowledge practices, Durham: Duke University Press.
◆2002 'Externalities in comparative guise', Economy & Society (spec. iss.) ‘The technological economy’, A Barry & D Slater (eds), 31: 250-67.
◆2001 'The patent and the Malanggan', Theory, Culture, & Society, 18: 1-26.
◆2001 'Rationales of ownership' (Introduction) & 'Global and local contexts'. In L Kalinoe & J Leach (eds), Rationales of ownership: Ethnographic studies of transactions and claims to ownership in contemporary Papua New Guinea, New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors Ltd. As above, in vol. reissued as Rationales of ownership: Transactions and claims to ownership in contemporary Papua New Guinea, Wantage: Sean Kingston Publishing, 2004.
◆2001 'Same-sex and cross-sex relations: some internal comparisons'. In T Gregor & D Tuzin (eds), Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia: An exploration of the comparative method, Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.
◆2000 'Environments within: an ethnographic commentary on scale'. In K Flint & H Morphy (eds), Culture, landscape, and the environment: The Linacre lectures 1997, Oxford: OUP.
◆2000 Introduction: New accountabilities; Afterword: Accountability and ethnography. In M. Strathern (ed) Audit cultures. Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy, [EASA series in Social Anthropology], London: Routledge.
◆2000/01 'Abstraction and decontextualisation: an anthropological comment' [ESRC conference ‘Virtual Society? Get Real!’], Cambridge Anthropology, 22: 52-66. Revised in S Woolgar (ed), Virtual Society? Technology, cyberbole, reality. Oxford: OUP, 2002.
◆2000 'The tyranny of transparency', British Education Research Journal, 26: 309-21.

◆1999 'The ethnographic effect' [ch 1]; 'The aesthetics of substance' [ch 3]; 'Refusing information' [ch 4]. In M Strathern, Property, substance and effect. Anthropological essays on persons and things, London: Athlone Press. Ch. 3 Abridged in N Cummings and M Lewandowska (eds), Capital: a project by Neil Cumings and Mariysia Lewandowska, London: Tate Publishing, 2001. Ch. 3 Reprinted in V Buchli (ed), Material culture: critical concepts. A reader, New York: Routledge, 2004.
◆1999 'What is intellectual property after?' In J Law & J Hassard (eds), Actor network theory and after, Oxford: Blackwells / Sociological Review monograph.
◆1998 'Divisions of interest and languages of ownership'. In C Hann (ed) Property relations: renewing the anthropological tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge U. P.
◆1998 'Surrogates and substitutes: new practices for old?' In J M M Good & I Velody (eds), The politics of postmodernity, Cambridge: CUP.
◆1998 'The new modernities'. In V Keck (ed), Common worlds and single lives: constituting knowledge in pacific societies, Oxford: Berg.
◆1998 'Social relations and the idea of externality'. In C Renfrew & C Scarre (eds), Cognition and material culture: the archaeology of symbolic storage, Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs.
◆1997 'Pre-figured features: A view from the Papua New Guinea Highlands'. In J Woodall (ed) Portraiture: Facing the subject, Manchester: MUP. Revised as 'Pre-figured features: A view from the Papua New Guinea Highlands', Australian J. of Anthropology, 8: 89-103, 1997.
◆1996 'Cutting the network' Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
◆1996 'Enabling identity? Biology, choice and the new reproductive technologies' Questions of cultural identity
◆1994 ‘Displacing knowledge: technology and its consequences for kinship’Life and death under high technology medicine, 1994
◆1994 ‘Parts and wholes: refiguring relationships in a post-plural world’in Descola,P.(eds.)Conceptualizing society, Routladge
◆1987 'An awkward relationship: The case of feminism and anthropology' Signs 12(2)
◆1985 'Kinship and economy: constitutive orders of a provisional kind' American Ethnologist, 1985

■言及

◆春日直樹 2007 「手がかりとしての「資源」――イリイチからストラサーン、そしてイリイチへ」 『資源人類学01 資源と人間』,弘文堂 pp.135-157
「「行為体(agent)とは人を至上の主体とする見解を捨てて導入された概念だが、一般的には行為体が行為体の意図によって引き起こされるという見方が支配的である。ストラサーンが意識して抗するのはこの見解であり、彼女は行為体がさまざまな他人の観点に立ちながら、あくまで他人を代表して――文字どおり他人の代理人として――一つの行為を引き起こすという点を鮮明に主張する。つまり、行為体である人は特定の他人の観点から自己を再構成しようとして、その他人を理由=原因に行為を起こす」(p150)

「ストラサーンは人とモノ、行為体が織りなす行為を原因=理由と「効果=結果」(effect)との関係として記述する。ジェルの指摘するように、近代西洋は人のかかわる行為とモノの服する因果法則とを区分し続けるのだから、彼女は人がモノ化しモノがヒト化する世界をあらわすために、「理由―効果」―つまり人の行為と「原因―効果」―モノの因果法則―を同時に網羅する表現としてcause-effectを選んだといえよう。」(p151)

◆春日直樹 2009「物語と人と現実とのもう一つの関係――メラネシアから考える」
 野家啓一編 『歴史/物語の哲学』岩波書店 pp.141-160
「同一人物が同時刻に別な場所にいる場合について話を進めたい。この種の話をフィジーで耳にするのは珍しくはない。…特別な状況には違いないが自分はたった一つではなく同じ瞬間に別の形で存在する可能性を秘めている。>147>この可能性を論じる上で有益なのは、人類学者マリリン・ストラサーンがメラネシアから提起した「分割できる人」(partible person)という概念である。ストラサーンは、レーナルトが人格について展開した議論を批判的に継承してこの概念を導く。レーナルトによれば、カナク人は「自分が他の者と取り結ぶ関係をとおしてしか自分自身を認識しない。」ストラサーンはこれを認めて、メラネシアでは人は他者との関係の結節点として初めて存在すると考える(人が関係をつくるのではなく、その逆である)ただし彼女は、レーナルトが人格の中心を空白と表現したのは不適切であると指摘する。レーナルトは人間が自己の人格の所有者になってこそ一個人であるという、西洋風の「所有的個人」の通念から脱却できていない。メラネシア人におって、所有の主体や対象というラベルを貼るのは無意味である。彼らは何かやりとりしあって、関係を構築しつづけるが、それは所有物の交換ではなく贈与であり、人の一部を付着させてモノを送ったり送られたりする行為である。メラネシアではこうした贈与を通じて関係がつくられ、同時に贈与を構成する人が生成する。人はさまざまな贈与と関係の結節点として存在し続けるのだから、諸関係を弁別できるとの同じく分割ができる、というわけである。」146−147

「彼女(ストラサーン)は社会科学全般の行為のとらえ方が、西洋中心主義であると批判する。ちょうど人が所有主体として想定されるように、行為もまた人が自分の立場から石をもって他者に働きかけるものだと理解される。どちらも商品交換の論理の延長にあり、人はあくまで他人を客体視する主体として行為者にされている。メラネシアをみれば、人が関係を構築する主体ではなく、関係によって構築される効果にすぎないのと同様に、行為体もまた別の人に対して効果を発揮する存在でなく、他者に起因する効果でしかない。具体的にいえば、自分の立場から主体として働きかけるのではなく、他人の見地に立って、文字どおり他人の代理人(エージェント)として動くのである。」150

「ストラサーンの提示するメラネシア人像は、たしかにフィジー人の行為を理解しやすくする。他者の視線をたえず気にかけ、力不相応の贈与につとめ、他者の呪力を案じつづける彼らにとって、自分は諸関係による効果でしかなく、その行為は原則として他者によって引き出されている。逆にいえば、自身を「理由」=「原因」として堂々と行為することは、大変に恐ろしいことなのだ。それは普通の彼らにとっては、自分が人でなくなり、他者の霊や神々によって早晩に死へと至らしめられうかもしれない暴挙である。そんなことをして平然としていられるのは、行為者みずからが霊や神に等しいマナの持ち主だからに違いない。」151

◆春日直樹 2009 「モースに敬意を表するとき」『現代思想』37(10)pp.212-22
「一般に贈与とは、人が物(および人)を他の人に与えることとされる。ところがモースの強調するように人の一部が物(そして人)に付着して物が人のようになり、また逆に人が物のように見えるとすれば、人と物の境界は多分に流動的なものに変わる。人が物を贈るという行為は、人に変化した物が別の人に別な物を人のように贈らせるという行為として認識できる。人と物の区別はおろか、主体と客体という弁別さえ微妙になる。何が主体で何が客体かを容易に確定できない以上、贈与を当たり前の行為として描くのは適切でない。人と物、主体と客体の関係が絶えず変換を遂げる過程としてとらえなおすべきである。この試みは、1980年代に人類学者マリリン・ストラサーンによって遂行された。…彼女は、人と物がジェンダーを帯びた姿で贈与を通じて生成変化を遂げるモデルを提示した。メラネシアにおける人は、潜在的には両性具有者として存在する。たとえば、胎児の段階で父親から「養われ」、乳児になると母親から彼女の精液に由来するというミルクで育てられるように、父方・母方の双方から精液を受けて、どちらのジェンダーにもなりうる」216

「そもそもメラネシアモデルでは、個人や集団を構成要素とする社会が一定の境界をもって存在するわけではない。そこには、贈与を介する関係の連鎖があるだけで、「社会的」な状況は作られても「社会」自体が見えてくることはないのだ」217

◇James Leach "Knowledge as Kinship" 2009 Sandra Bamford and James Leach(eds.) Kinship and Beyond The Genealogical Model Reconsidered Berghan Books,pp.175-192
"Marilyn Strathern conclude that the essence of the problem face by analysts of Papua New Guinea highland societies lies in the tension between spciety and biology, or between social relationships and genea;ogical relationships in athropological accounts." 182
  *"Parts and Whole"に対する言及

◇James Leach Creative Land 1998

Marilyn Strathern has discussed the way 'complication' arises where there are ''alwasy more things to take into accout' She sites a backgrouund, 'a cultural milieu', to this, which is committed to notions of pluralism and multiplication,

A cultural account of Western plularism would address the way a sense of both diversity and of an increase in the complexitiy of phenomena is produced by changing the scale of observations(strathern 1992). By changing scale I mean switching from one perspective on a phenomenon to another, as anthropologists routinely do in organising their materials. It is made possible by a modelling of nature that regards the world as naturally composed of entities- a multiplicity of individuals or classes or relationships-whose characteritics are in turn regarded as only partially described by analytic schema. 53

◇Viveiros de Castro The Gift and The Given 2009 Sandra Bamford and James Leach(eds.) Kinship and Beyond The Genealogical Model Reconsidered Berghan Books  pp.237-268

My interest in the relation between kinship and magic has it proximate source in a series of converstions with Marilyn Strathern, especially a discussion we had in 1998 in Brazil about intellectual property rights(IPR). In an interview she gave to Carlos Fausto and my self, I introduced the IPR(Intellectual property right) theme with somewhat imprudent suggestion that the concept of 'right' is the form the relation takes in a commodity economy. In a regime where things and people assume the form of objects, relations are exteriorized, detached from persons in the form of rights. ……At the time none of us found this a very promising line of inquiry, and in a recent paper, Strathern zeroed in on the debt as the gift-economy correlative of right, in accordance with Fausto's answer to my question during our converstion of siy years ago: gift is to debt as commodity is right. 248


◇2010 Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo "The Untimely, Again"in Pierres Clastres Archeology of Violence pp.9-51
This is the anthropological project that, initiated in the Golden Age of Boas, Malinowski,and Mauss, consolidated itself during the period when CLastres was writing and has continued to the present, form Claude Levi-Strauss to Marshall Sahlins, from Roy Wagner to Marilyn Strathern:the passage form an image of the Other defined by a state of lack or need, by a native distance in relation to the Self, to an alterity endowed with endo-consistency, autonomy or independence in relation to the image of our selves. What Levi-Sturass did for classificatory reason, with the notion of savage thought, what Shalins did for economic rationality, with his original affluent society, what Wagner did for the concept of culture (and nature), with his meta-semiotics of invention and convention, and what Strahern did for the notion of society (and individual), Clastres did for power and authority, with his society against the State――the construction, by way of the image of the other, of another image of the object (an image of the object that incorporates the image that the other makes of this object) : another image of thought, of economy, of culture, of sociality, of politics. 25-26

■引用

◆Property substance & Effect

In so far as the ethnographer's location can be seen as alternating, then each offers a perspective on the other. One of the elements which makes fieldwork challenging is that it is carried out with a quiet different activity (writing) in mind. And what makes the study which follows in its own way equally challenging is that it turns out in fact to be much more than a matter of writing-up-for the writing only works, as the student discovers, as an imaginative re creation of some of the effects of fieldwork itself. 1

When one thinks of different parts of a special system as having their own trajectories, one can see that the system is going to change through time uneven and unpredictable ways. Here is another connotation of complexity. Over the same period as social anthropology has confronted the 'complex' effects of writing in the knowledge of new perceptions of the relationship between writing and fieldwork, outside anthropology ideas about complex systems -derived in the first place from mathematics, as well as biology and other natural sciences- have been applied to the study of human organizations. One consequence of this is of interest in the present context: it renews a long-standing challenge to the very idea of date collection. 3

It is significant that field immersement is repeated in the subsequent study away from the field, Ethnographers set themselves the task not just of comprehending the effect that certain practices and artefacts have in people's lives, but of re-creating some of those effects in the context of writing about them. Of course analysis ('writing' ) begins 'in the field' as much as the ethnographer's hosts continue to exert a pull on the direction of his or her energies long after. 6

There are many already established and thus conventional reifications in social anthropology, in the recent past the most powerful being the concepts of 'culture' and 'society'. These things, consistently shown up not to be things at all while all along continuing to behave just like that in people's writings, condense into concrete images whole spectra of relations, They thus present themselves as(analytical) categories of knowledge; a universe of data is at once bound up in these terms and is organized by them so as to appear as certain kinds of information. One can as a consequence interrogate such categories, and use them interrogate other categories. 14

Magnificently, Gell sweeps all that aside. In terms of the effects of entities upon one another, and it is the analysis of relational effect which in his view makes analysis of relational effect which in his view makes analysis anthropological, 'things' and 'persons' may be co-presences in a field of effectual actors.
There is also interest here for the analysis of property relations. Property as a relation had long been central to anthropological theorizing, with or without reface to theories of political economy, and the long-standing indigenous Euro-American critique of property relation could be @provided Gell with a secondary model for his analysis of art. Like 'art', property is a specific cultural form whose counterparts elements elsewhere social anthropologist may demonstrate or deny. 17-18

Kirsch's(1997) criticism is well then. He described how the widespread stereotype of Papua New Guineans as greedy landowners out for that they can get, is familiarized at home as well-jokes about unscrupulous who would sell anything for money are relished by Papua New Guinean audience. And anthropologists.229

In short, the relationship (between misfortune and the cause of it) is simultaneously rendered an object of attention in personal terms (a relationship between social actors) while being reified through the appearance of the land itself. Alterations to the environment appearance of the land itself. Alterations to the environment brought about by the mining - and some Yonggom hold that the total environment has changed, form departed animals to poisonous rain and harmful sun- make manifest the form of a world which contains both villagers and a mine company and its workers, It is not precisely because these effects are visible aspects of what is perceived as a social relationship (between these people and the mine (owners) that one can write of an issue of 'moral' responsibility at all? 231

The land always lay between persons. It once gave people heir biographies, imagined in spatial terms as events linked to particular named places(Kirsch 1996). People thus saw their lives as a set of movements across land that was also landscape (1995). However. For the Yonggom, it seems that time has since become a new axis, and lives are measured against a chronology of when missionaries came, the mind opened, the river changed. This echoes the kind of apocalyptic difference which people elsewhere in Papua New guinea see in the 'new time' which has come upon them (Chapter 5).

The surface of the ground thus takes a form though the grasses, plants and fruits that grow upon it; the ground was formerly evidence of the state of relations between person and spirits. 232

The 'spirits of this sacred landscape did not themselves live beneath it but made their own tracks over it, and required sacrifice from time to time to keep the ground fertile (1994)' Certain spirits were also seen as a source of pigs and shell wealth.

Renaissance theories of perspective would map the paintings as co-ordinates of the viewer's capacity to see, and what the fifteenth-century viewer there by sees is princely power. Thus classical motifs on the ceiling disguise the privileges of wealth and power as the rewards of study and leaning. For knowing the events and figures to which they allude make the viewer-and Starn is thinking now of the prince- aware of this own knowledge. 234

We might contrast this with the recursive perspective to which Stran refers, where the dimensions of the subject are returned to him (or her). The renaissance schema imposes, he observe(1989:220),'a strict visual discipline in return for the image of a finite world mastered by the beholder an proportioned to the beholder's eye' As I understand it, the viewer, who is completed by seeing the dimensions of his or her vision, is being completed by a structure that also personifies princely power. But while that power depends on being acknowledged by the other, a non-princely viewer can never embody it. I wish to turn to a different kind of recursive perspective that rests directly on a mutuality of embodiment, and which therefore animates rather specific mode of interpretation. 238

In exchanging gifts with one another, persons exchange perspectives, not just as knowledge of their relative positions but as parts of the other that each incorporates. 239

A Melanesian response to a configuration of plants or to the pitch of landscape is likely to refer to the intentions of others-whether of spirits, enemies or kin, What one thus encounters in making interpretations are always counter interpretations: to think that a chief is holding back the rains from the gardens, or that the ancestral potency of the land is being revealed in an abundant crop, become simultaneously one's interpretation of the meaning of certain simultaneously one's interpretation of the meaning of certain events and evidence that one is also the object of chiefly, or ancestral, attention. Evidence comes in the form of one's own effect on other persons. 239

The identity of each subclan thus rests in its names, and its identity is also its power. Since the number of names is held to be finite, brought into the world at beginning, the body of names that a subclan possesses for its members divides a totality composed of the names possessed by all subclans 242

Names are authenticated not by the originators of them but in the partition of knowledge between claimant and rival, so that it is the active intervention of other persons that delimits what a subject knows. The rival's utterance of one's own name is at once theft an repossession, a claim to an origin that has come from elsewhere. Are the debates 'writing' then? 245

This I believe, give us a useful re-entry into the Melanesian material. It gives us a further vocabulary fir the significance of form. If we take Amazonian vision as a kind of traffic between animate beings, the evidence of the traffic lies in the forms of those beings(a human being seeing another human being as an animal.) One see, so to speak, the effect of the relationship. In Melanesia, the appearance of the land, the state of people's bodies, the resource they have at their disposal, are all signs of traffic. The traffic may be conceptualized as between human beings and spirits, as in the case of Avatip or Duna, or in Hagen when people there still think of ancestral whosts, and variously between humans and animals; however (I suggest) humanity, and thus a division between humans and others, is not the principal ontological axis. I do not think that the difference between 'spirit' or 'animal' and 'human' has been the archetype for perspectival traffic in the Amazonian sense. Rather, it is persons who offer perspectives on one another.


◇Parts and Wholes refiguraing relationships ina post-plural world.
pp75-104

Insetad of dismantling holistic systems through inappropriate analytical categories, then, perhaps we should strive for a holistci apprehension of the manner in which our subkectsd dismantle thier own constructs. 76

Contemporary Melanesian ethnography, especially but not only from the Austronesian-speaking seaboradrd, is developing its own microvocaburarly of dissolution. It describes the proceses by with the elements that compose person are dismantled so that the relationship persons carry can be invested anew.
…… These recall Bloch's (1986) arresting account from elesewhere in the Austronesian-speaking world of the literal regourping of the dead in their tombs. But if relationships reproductive of persons have to be dissloved at death, other melanesians see birth as the principale substitutive act by which new relations displace previous one(Gillison 1991). Indeed, all knowledge of a revalatory kind may appear as decomposition (strathern 1988). 76

The inrony is that what clouds the anthropologists'holistic enterprise in the late twentieth century is no longer individualism. The 'death of the individual' has seen to that. Rather, the problem is the Western dismantling of the very vategory that once carried the concept of a holistic entity, that is 'society'.Society was a vhehicle for a kind of Western holism, a totalizing concept through which modern people could think the hollisms of ohters. Nowa days it seems to belong more to text than to life. 77

The image of hybrid form was in fact already there in the plurarilst world, It was not just the replication of like units(a multitude of distinctive but analigoussocieties ) that pluralized anthropological vision, along with others; an eqully powerful source of pluyrarlism lay in the way different domains or orders of knowledge were brought together. Here a multitude of perspective could pluralize the character of antyhing held up to study. 77

This chapter is a late-twentieth century attempt to refigure certain relationship as they have been conceptualized in this recent, pluralist past. The relationships in question belong to an apparently small domain of anthropological inquiry,those Melanesian kinship systems known as congantic. This is beause of the assumption that, despite the insignificance of kinship in Western of Euro-American society, Euro-American systems are similarly cognatic in character. Yet we cannot have it both ways; either bothe mode of reckonning and degree of significance are comparable or neither is. I suggest that failure to attend to the particularity of our own kinshipthinking has also been failure to attend symbolic precesses in anthropological thinking. It si these that have, over the last century or so, both endorsed the concept of society and dissolved it before our eyes. 78

As a pre-existing whole, society makes individuals into parts of itself by severing them from other pre-existing domains. Thus the whole society sets itself against the private culture of deach domestic group(Radcliff-Brown's point of view. ) 80

If individula persons were in this midventury view(20th) made into members of group/society as a whole, they were also regarded as having naturally pre-exsiting identities. THese derived both from their biological or psychological makeup and from the domestic domain. SInce domestic and politico-jural domains were conceptualized as cutting up social life into components that were not reducible to one another, each gave a different perspective on social life; and whilie they combined in single persons(Every member of a society is simultaneously a person in the domestc domain and in the politico-jural domain) they represented quite distinct relational fields. …In short, what gave the part('the individual') distinctiveness as a whole person was not what made the person a part of the whole society. 81

suppose Garia conceived the person as a model for relationships. Instead of trying to find the groups of which a person is a member, one would then consider what modeling or relationships the person him or herself contains And if Garia society were modeleded in the conmpassing uty of the singular human being, a person would in this sense not be a part anything elese. Amultitude of persons would simply magnify the image of one. 81

In Western terms it would seem a paradox that relationships are not mapped as external connections among a plurality of individuals. Instead, the singularity of the Garia person is conceptualized as a (dividual) figure that encompasses plurality. If in the Garia view there are no relationships that are not submitted to the person's definition of them, then what the person contains is an apprehension of those relations that he or she activates without. If they pre-exist, it is as internal differences within his or her composite body. This, I believe, s also an image of the 'group'. Garia conceptualizations suggest that whatever sociality constitutes the person also constitutes the manner in which relations compose the stock or bush god territories. 82

So what do we do with the recuurent internal division of persons into male and female elements? In their figure of the kkindred, focused on a living sibling set with its constelleation of maternal and paternal kin, or the bush god territory, focused on an ancestral sibling set with access divided between male- oan female-born, Garia conceptualize a composite androgynous person. 82

Single-Sex persons are presented through the bodies of men or of women or thorugh the mobile female or male items of wealth that pass between them. The decomposition of the composite person thereby reveals the relations, at onece internal and external, of which he or she is composed. 83

At death, the person is divided, and as Annette Weiner(1976, 1979, 1983) has shown, the descent group achieves unitary form as a collection of ancestral spirits waiting to be reborn, this is a moment at which it appears as a single-sex entity- as it also appears in the image of land or of blood that contain the living body. When it takes after the living person, however, the descent groupp appears in the form of its numerous extensions and relations to others:land attracts sons to stay, and the foetus is nourished by the father. 83

The neighbouring Molima of Fergusson Island(chowing 1989) also separete paternal and maternal kin after daeth. Like garia, the Molima kinship system would have to be called cognatic. Yet the relative lack of differentiation among consanguines hold only the relative lack of differentiation among consanuguines holds only during an indiviidual's lifetime. At death, the body of kins dissloves into those whose ties to deceased are throguh women and those whose ties are thorugh men. 84

During a lifetime, a singular person exists as an integral part of relations, if we wish to figure it that way, but only in the sense that the part is made from the same material as the whole. Relations also appear as an integral part of persons- the Garia security circle being managed by people's dospositions, the trobriand descent group with its outward extensions toward others, What makes the person, then, is no different from what makes up these relations. 85

What is not at issue is that swith of perspective required to perceive an individual as an entity differently constituted from the relationships of which it is part. It is impossible, for instance, to imagine a person cut off from relations and remaining alive(cf. Leenhardt 1979). A person is only divested of relations when it no longer embodies them. 85-6

Where a prototypical Melanesian might have conceptualized the dissolution of the cognatic person as making incomplete an entity already completed by the actions of others, our prototypical English took the person- powefully symbolized in the child that must be socialized- as requiring completion by society. To focus on the individual person inevitable dissloved this laeger category, fragmenting the 'level' at wichi holism could be seen. Radcliffe-Brown called for the comparison of whole systems because(fromt the point of view of systems) only systems were whole. The wEnglish paradox was that holism was a feature of a part-not the whole-of social life! 87

Unilineal desecent group were taken as evinving the characteritstics of orderly social life, above all, membership could be demonstrated. Indeed, in their linship organization, many non-Western peoples seemed to be doing what the anthropologists was also doing in elucidatiing social structure:classifiying according to conventions of social life. The individual person was situated withhin an order of sociality- descent and succession- whose identity clearly endured beyond the life of any one member. 'Life' as such became an attribute of abstract social system(Fortes 1958:1). From the perspective of descent, a group could be conceptualized as a (single) juristic person(Fortes 1969:304). Yet as we have seen, the same argument assumed that what made individual person mambers of a whole group was not what made the whole persons.

Hence the significance of the distinction between 'descent' and kinship and between those (politico-jural) relations that affected group affiliation and those focused on ego as an individual. to the extent that the first set of relation appeared social, the second appeared based on natural connections. 88

Cognatic kinship thus emerged as a kind of groud against which the social relations based on agnation appear. the creation of the latter came to looke like the vreation of society(out of nature). One may depict it thus:(1) Desvent groups examplified the creations of social difference-booundedn sociocentric entities cut out of the ramifying networks of individuals. Society was evident in conventional differentiation. (2) The field of cognatic kin thus appeared as a set of consanguines naturally undifferentiated- the raw material of kinship. 88

descriptive system appeared to display neither artufucakuty nor convention. If the descriptive system did not need explanation by reference ot social convention, its terminologies could be mapped directly onto(natural) relations of consnguinity. To later anthropologists it seemed therefore that one hardly needed social theory to understand it. This was a drastic assumption, for by the mid-twentieth century convention had become the object of study, and the problems for untangling appeared all the other way. Kinship systems that produved groups were no trouble. The troubke with cognatic system was that tracing cognatic kinshio could neither in a strong sense produve groups nor in a wak sense yield a sense of convention or society. Here, in the absence of lineality, was the inverse case: (1) Cognatic kinship reflected natural difference in the bilateral recknoning of relations. (2) But the field of cognatic kin was thus socially undifferentiated and groups had to be cut out of this field by criteria of a different order. 90

Society, like the analyses anthropologist produved,was to be made visible in its internal differentiations and categorizations, the social segments it cut from nature. Yet in the cognatic case one saw only the endless recombination of elements developed from and focusing on individuals. 90

It is to such a switch of perspectives that the kinship constructs of the mid-twentieth century gave facticity and certainty. What was embedded in anthropological kinship thinking was, I susect, reflected back by the folk models of the 'wider society' of which it was a part. 91




*作成:近藤 宏
UP: 20100916
WHO 

TOP HOME (http://www.arsvi.com)