◆Kant, Immanuel 1764-65 "Bemerken zu den Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schoneund Erhabenen"＝1966 尾渡達雄訳 1764-65 「『美と崇高の感情に関する考察』覚え書き」，『教育学・小論集・遺稿集』理想社，カント全集16）:259-355
"My body belongs to me. That is because my body is part of my ego and is driven by my will. As long as I can coerce it and move it around with my will, the world that has no individual will or the entire inanimate world is mine. The sun is not mine. The same is true of other human beings. Thus, any proprietary rights (proprietas) are not exclusively a proprietary right. However, as long as I desire to exclusively own a certain thing, at least I would not presuppose others' will as being against my own will, nor would I presuppose that action is contrary to my own action. Therefore, I will implement the actions that symbolize my own possessions, like cutting trees; I would work these into various things. Other might say to me, "That is mine." That is because it belongs to me by my actions of selective will." (Kant 1764/65=1966:309, cited in Tateiwa 1997:1)
"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding!" (Kant [1784=1974:7])
Philosophers like Kant are cited by those who attempt to assert the "dignity" of each individual in opposition to utilitarianism. I understand why this approach is taken. Because of the invocation of the idea of the "person," however, there is not such big difference between the two viewpoints. Keiserlingk, for example, states that there is no contradiction between "Quality of Life (QOL)" and "Sanctity of Life (SOL)" (Keiserlingk [1983]), and while, as Kurosaki points out, this compatibility is achieved by altering the concept of SOL to bring it in line with an approach based on QOL (Kurosaki 19871991]), this sort of manipulation is often carried out. Kant and bioethics are discussed in Tsuchiyama ed. [1996]. In Inoue [1996] it is claimed that Keiserlingk's perspective is that of Kant (see also Tsukasaki [1996]), and in Hirata [1996] it is asserted that Kantian ethics are fundamentally based on a QOL perspective. In Tarui [1996], on the other hand, it is asserted that the Kantian view does not require that some appropriate level of ability be present in individuals: "Rights, according to Kant, amount to an 'assumed' relationship between members of a community, a 'relationship between each individual and all other individuals' in which each person accepts an obligation to protect and not to harm other individuals, even those who lack (as most people do) the 'empirical' ability to maintain their own lives and resources" (Tarui [1996:61]. See also the symposium summary in Oguma [1996]). I do not deny that this kind of interpretation is possible. If this approach is taken, however, the question of what is being designated as the subject of rights and what is being designated as the object of ownership arises (cf. Chapter 2 Note 4). For an examination of the arguments of Kant and Hare, see Niita [1994] [1996]. On Engelhardt's criticisms of Kant's writings concerning suicide/deontology, see Marutani [1996]. On "autonomy" and enlightment," see Tanida [1996]. On the relationship between Kant and bioethics in the English speaking world, see Kurata [1996]. Related issues are also discussed in Sections 3 to 5 of Chapter 7.