"It seems to me that laboratory reproduction is radically human compared to conception by ordinary heterosexual intercourse. It is willed, chosen, purposed and controlled, and surely these are among the traits that distinguish Homo sapiens from other in the animal genus, from the primates down. Coital reproduction is, therefore, less human than laboratory reproduction-more fun, to be sure, but with our separation of baby making from lovemaking, both become more human because they are matters of choice, and not chance. This is, of course, essentially the case for Planned Parenthood. I cannot see how either humanity or morality are served by genetic roulette." (Fletcher 1971:781)
Chapter 2 examined logical attempts to justify personal ownership. In section 2, the assertions made after Locke, "The thing I have made is mine" has been accepted as faith, only. Section 3 examined "functionalism," and under certain conditions, a definite emergence in relationship to personal ownership can be seen. If one approves of the effect brought by these relationships within that realm, one sees that personal ownership is justified. In section 4, however, when one presupposes mobility of resource (capability), one sees that transfer of personal ownership has been justified, as well. The results remain unchanged even with justice, fairness, or with Utilitarianism. The conclusion of the logic is not accepted (even though a consensus may have been made), and I do not think that a transfer of life should be accepted. Yet, we still remain with the question "Why?"
Chapter 3 examined statements criticisms in criticisms toward reproductive technology. Section 1 discussed decision-making through force. In this case, one sees that even a decision made against one's will is also a part of decision-making. In this example, I explained the reason for setting a forced condition, while asking whether or not a forced condition needed to be established in decision-making. Section 2 examined the disparity between the resources of various individuals from an impartial viewpoint. Regarding the issue of the wealthy who utilize technology, I noted that technology should be made available to all. Regarding the issue of women who, due to their poverty, must become surrogate mothers, even though that is the case, I still wonder why reproductive technology must be seen as a problem. Assertions examined so far are still yet to be considered. The points raised in that particular section were not core indicators of resistance or doubt. Although approval offerings may be made in good faith, there are times when these transactions are not approved. No country accepts the selling and buying of organs. In general, surrogate mother contracts are to be the same illegal type of contract as selling and buying organs, and they are not acceptable. Although offerings may be made in good faith, there are times when transactions are prohibited or doubted. Self-ownership of organs has not been clearly defined. However, "common sense" suggests that we resist these conclusions. But why cannot "Others" be interfered with? Let us reconsider the unresolved issue in chapter 2. Chapter 3, section 3, discussed the commonality of donation and transaction. It is here that one must attempt to understand where and when the resistance to transferring organs began.