"Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property." (Locke 1689=1868:32-33; 1988:287-288,sec.27)
In this chapter, I will examine the logic that has attempted to justify private property. That is, logic does not raise a problem noted in preface and Chapter 1, and assertion on that "Since it is within realm of self-decision I cannot do anything about it. Or I feel resigned to fate.
And I see no problems in that logic;" it is a task which examines where assertion of self-decision originated. From there on, I think we might be able to understand what compels us to ask the question.
I will address the question in section 1. As I have explained in the beginning of this book, most of the time objections to decisions regarding private property as self-evident, start at exactly that point. But the problem is the area which is treated as self-evident; in short, the problem is, on what grounds has wealth been allocated to each individual?
In Section 2, in answer to this question, since Locke's advocacy of"what I made is mine" has been realized, I will confirm that this advocacy has been taken over by logicians called "Libertarians," and further by "bioethicists." And, after all, assertion in the belief that "what I made should be mine," can be realized only as faith but not as ex-post facto.
Another issue on "functionalism," will be examined in Section 3, and I will inquire about assurance of the emergence--limited to this issue--of the relationship between labor results and private property under certain conditions. I will describe these conditions. In addition, if I am to affirm the conditions that give rise to this, within that limit, when only all other conditions have been met, I will see this justification of self-property as being possible as the result of labor.
But in Section 4, I will change one of the conditions, and when the resources (capability) of transferability have been promised, private property of the resources for production (for example a physical body) itself, cannot be noted since the prohibition of transfer cannot be justified. Not agreeing sides with the notorious utilitarianism which asserts "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," the result would not be changed even if the principles of impartiality and equality were established. I think the logical conclusion would not be confirmed. Suppose there was "consent" from each individuals, the transferring may not be confirmed. But why is that? The above-mentioned logic will not answer this question.