Book Review of
On Private Property
Book Reviews and Information on On Private Property, by Shinya Tateiwa, 1997 Keiso Shobo.
Translation by Robert Chapeskie & Tsuyako Miyasato
1. Shin'ichiro Inaba (稲葉 振一郎), Okayama University
Book Review Column, the Intellective Reading Notes: Bekkan (Homepage)
2. Masahiro Morioka, Asahi Newspaper, 1997-10-5
3. Noritaka Furutani, November 1997
"Bioethics Study Network Newsletter" 3-10 (Oct. 1997): 6
4. "Philanthropy (Monthly Philanthropy)" 18-10 (1999-12, no. 203): 23, November, 15, 1997
Issued by Philanthropy Book Review, Japan Philanthropic Association
5. Kyoji Kobayashi, Daisaburo Hashizume, Katsuya Hirose and
Daisaburo Hashizume, Yomiuri Newspaper, 1997-12-8
6. Daisaburo Hashizume, "Special Feature in Questionnaires-The Fruit of 1997," Shukan Dokusho-Jin (1997) 2215:2
7. Yasutaka Ichinokawa, "Review", Shukan Dokusho-Jin, (1997): 2215:6
8. Yoichiro Murakami, "Top Three books of 1997," Mainichi Newspaper, 1997-12-21
9. Masahiro Morioka, Top Three Books Chosen by Book Review Committee,
Asahi Newspaper, 1997-12-21
10. Hiroaki Yoshii, "The Fruit of Sociological Works," Shukan Dokusho-Jin (1997): 22161:
11. Keiko Toshimitsu, review, Journal of Life (1998): 44:85
12. Kokoku (Hakuho-Do), Column on the "In formation on Recommended Libraries" (1998): V.3
13. Sumihiko Kumano, Shiso 1998-3
14. Shuichi Kato, "Traveling Around the Reading Diary" Conner, Kato's Web site
15. Satoru Saishu, "Being an Ordinary Person: Reading Life of Mine by Different Authors", Shukan Asahi, (1998): 132-133
16. Osamu Nagase (Disability Communication Research Center), Kikan Fukushi Rodo (1998): 78:104-105
Book Review on "Other Lives as Other" in On Personal Property (From the World: 8)
17. Noriko Seyama, "Monthly Begin" 53 (1998-3):6 (People with Disabilities Information Network)
"A Place of Connections" (A Book that I Read) March 26, 1998,
Book Review on On Personal Property, by Shinya Tateiwa
18. Kaoru Kato, Other Who Appear on the Boarder Line (Human Documents)
"WE'LL" (1988): 3-10-59-61 (Attack International 0422-20-8515)
19. By Kazumi Yoneda, "Nursing Education" 39-5 (1998-5): 386 (Igaku Shoin)
20. Masatsugu Hori, "Study on Normalization"
21. Naoya Sasaki, June 23, 1998
22. Shuichi Nakayama, "Twenty-Fives Books that Tell You about Today's Japan,"
"Litteraire" Additional Volume "Books to be Read This Year-Hap Push Best in 99", Metalogue
23. Hiroto Tahara , 1998
23. Jiro Koyanagi, "Gensen-kan," Shohyou Honya,January 19, 1999
25. Chiaki Hayasi, April 4, 2000
"Personally Wondering on the Book and Read Flaked into On Personal Property by Shinya Tateiwa", "Because This is a Woman's (My) Body" 176:15-19
◆Morioka Masahiro（森岡 正博）
Asahi Shimbun, October 5th 1997.
Somewhere in their heart of hearts most people hope their children are born with sound minds and bodies. They want their own child at least not to be born with a disability. How many couples could be said not to possess this kind of instinct?
Today the leading edge of medical technology is rapidly surpassing anything we could have imagined. For example, within the blood of a pregnant woman there are a very small number of cells belonging to her fetus. This means that if a sample of her blood is taken and the fetal cells within it are examined it ought to be possible to determine whether or not her child will be born with a disability. Here in Japan research into this kind of technology is currently underway at Kanazawa Medical University.
What should parents do if a blood test reveals their child will be disabled? Should they give birth anyway? Should they abort the pregnancy? They want an able bodied child and do not want the burden of caring for a son or daughter with a disability, but there is also opposition to killing a child which has already begun to grow.
Tateiwa Shinya's On Private Property directly addresses this very difficult problem. Is the way of thinking which holds that giving birth to a disabled child creates nothing but difficulties and causes both the parents and the child in question to be unhappy really correct?
To begin with, Tateiwa suggests that those who feel sorry for disabled children may be caught up in the idea that "my child is one of my belongings". Whether or not a child's life is unhappy is something which must be determined by the child itself.
There are parents who choose to give birth knowing that their child will be disabled and go on to live a "normal" life full of both happiness and suffering. Delving into the reason(s) behind their decision ought to provide a key to how this problem might be addressed.
Tateiwa looks for an approach in which the temptation to "do whatever is necessary to have an able-bodied child" is opposed and the option of "not choosing what sort of characteristics my child will have" is put forward and carefully explored. His book is a moving attempt to stare directly into the mire of human egoism and acknowledge the existence of "internal eugenic thought" while at the same time looking for a single ray of light capable of shining through this turbid landscape. It is the greatest such attempt in recent years in the field of bio-sociology.
◆MURAKAMI Yoichiro（村上 陽一郎）
Mainichi Shimbun, December 21st 1997.
From a selection of three of the year's most notable books as chosen by this reviewer.
While it might be a bit hard to imagine given its title, the next book [On Private Property] deals with issues surrounding eugenics, bioethics and medical ethics. This is a significant work by a young author who of course also directly addresses the topic of "property" itself from a sociological perspective.
◆Morioka Masahiro（森岡 正博）
Asahi Shimbun, December 21st 1997
From a selection of three of the year's most notable books as chosen by this reviewer.
[On Private Property] is the culmination of a tremendous effort on the part of its author. Arising amongst the many books churned out without this kind of diligence his more than ten year pursuit of these questions of life, bioethics and society is exceptional. Genuinely significant works of this kind can only be produced by authors able to endure isolation. I think an era of slowly savoring this kind of authentic effort is now beginning.
◆Review of "On private property" by Keiko Toshimitsu（利光 恵子） Published in Japanese in the Journal of Life (1998): 44:85
"On Private Property" - an intimidatingly serious-sounding title. The book is also three centimeters thick and each chapter is followed by detailed endnotes written in a small font. I suspect that most people who see it in a bookstore would hesitate to pick it up and attempt to read it. Once you begin, however, you quickly become absorbed by its contents. It is the kind of book which often has you nodding in agreement as issues and connections which had crossed your mind but which you had never put clearly into words are dealt with and clarified.
The topics covered include the debates surrounding organ transplantation, surrogate motherhood, and reproductive technologies/fertility treatments. Ideas about "the right of self determination", which has become a key phrase in discussions of this sort of "life and death" cutting edge medicine, are painstakingly assembled and fitted together like a stack of carefully placed toy blocks.
The author states that he wrote the book after becoming frustrated by the fact that discussion of these topics usually goes no further than the conclusion that whatever is being considered is indeed a difficult problem.
After examining various issues surrounding selective abortion of disabled fetuses he concludes that ultimately parents/women have the right to decide whether or not to give birth. He also states, however, that this is not the same as deciding what sort of existence and characteristics a child is to have if it is born.
"We should begin by stating that society seeking to reduce what is burdensome is itself something which makes life difficult for the people - and there will always be such people - whose reliance on the help and production of others and whose way of life differing from that of the majority are indeed sources of friction, and that a society which does not affirm that such people should be members of it is a society in which it is difficult for such people to live. ...is it not also possible for us to take an approach in which we do not actively decide our children's qualities and attributes and in which we choose not to eradicate what is accidental or contingent?
◆Book Review by Shuichi Kato（加藤 秀一）("Traveling Around the Reading Diary" Conner, 3/5/'98: 6)
March 5, 1998 (Thursday)
On Personal Property by Shinya Tateiwa published by Keiso Shobo. With such originality, strikingly rich in its contents, I am having an extremely difficult time trying to classify this book, to which group of "-logy" does it belongs. The main problems, raised in this book lie in the field of "bioethics," which include, brain death, organ transplantation, and the right to self-decision when considering abortion. The arguments Mr. Tateiwa develops in his book are quite philosophical. (Incidentally, I met bioethicist, professor Takashi Tsuchiya, when I visited the University of California, Berkley. He mentioned then that the book is very philosophical.) However, upon hearing, "If we do respect our senses, then we would begin to see various detailed problems," I wish to admit that, undoubtedly, the book is a "masterpiece of sociology." In Mr. Yoshitaka Ichinokawa's book review, "Shukan Dokusho-Jin," he writes that Tateiwa's book is an extension of a sociological tradition last seen from Durkheim. At this point, I wish to say that I simply agree with his opinion, rather than the point of raising the arguments from our "reality."
The book is titled On Personal Property, but is not a manual on the concept of "Personal Possession." As soon as the arguments began, it becomes self-event that "private possession" crumbles and is removed from the premise of any bioethical argument. If we were to introduce the book in this manner, readers with little patient might quickly presume, "Aha! The author criticizes overextension of today's individualism! The author sides with the school of Kyoto (Relativism)!" However, this is actually not so. Considering the results only, the author confirms the individual's "right to self-decision" on the issues of abortion or on the treatment that prolongs life. How do we connect clearly opposing issues of "denial of a self-possession" and "the right to self-decision"? This is the discussion we find at the core of Mr. Tateiwa's book.
Denial of "private possession" is not that simple. The idea of "what I made is mine" is certainly deep-rooted inside us; scrutinizing whether or not the origin is natural (whether or not it is instinctive or habitual) is not that important. The more we get at the essence and think about the issue, we start to see that the logic is not consistent. That is, we see so many things that belong to people even though they were not the producers. We see this crystal-clear in our own "bodies." I did not make my body. But, even then, this might violate the preoccupation of the arguments, although the sense of "my body" is "mine" was based on private possession. This does not mean, however, that the argument is proof; rather, it is a belief that has been presumed in every philosophical and ethical argument in recent years.
I wonder if "presuming not to be asked" is a modern idea (at least one of the main elements). However, thoughts change when historical conditions change. Locke and Mill did not have to deal with the challenge of how to deal with human organs after a person dies. They did not experience today's reality such as we do, arguing about "determining one's will" or "basing decisions on one's will." When a person is torn "literally" from the feudalistic and legalistic powers, which set the limits of life, the convoluted problem, (like self-decision, which is the pitfall of paternalism) did not exist. The problem is not whether or not one "visualizes" the problems are at high or low levels. John Locke and J. S. Mills were the kind of people able to fully develop their ideas without the burden of addressing the complex issues of today. This might have been true of Marx, who applied his arguments to labor theories.) However, we are still conditioned to various modernistic principles and values, yet we are not able to accept them without first pondering them a few times. We are conditioned to such various principles, but this is different from bringing forward anti-modernistic values, such as relationships and community. We are faced with pondering issues of modernistic values, such as self, self-decision, and various modernistic values.
Although not a new discovery or question, what would happen if we were to apply these issues to our immediate problems? What if we did not just repeat, "It is important for one to think over…", but we actually consider and seek an "answer." There are not many people who follow that path. The person who has demonstrated this manner of contemplation is Mr. Tateiwa, the author of On Personal Property.
Nevertheless, the author does not force the issue by attempting to overcome the issue of "private possession." On the contrary, the author points out that "private possession" cannot be absolute; twisting the issue will not unravel intricate arguments. If we cannot go forward to discuss the issue, then what shall we do? As such, applying "private possession" to a law of relativity will not solve anything.
Accordingly, what Mr. Tateiwa brings forward is, something else rooted deep inside us, the sense of "enjoying others." We must get a careful feeling for this sense. First and primarily, this is not "logic" but one's "desire." The author analyzes our unsophisticated denial of eugenics, and gets hold of it at the core. As is customary in post-modern literature, Mr. Tateiwa does not just state "other." (In personal opinion, this perhaps overlaps support of the mythical argument dealing with Levinas' "face." Mr. Tateiwa, however, does not refer to other people's arguments. This is a wonderful "self-righteous-ism.") In other words, with the phrase, "What is mine is mine," we might better understand the statement, "Think carefully. The world would be boring if things went the way we whished," or another statement, by deducing everything from existing senses, the author clarifies the reasons why we are tumbling with "bioethical" problems. Further, the author gives us an "answer" as to "how we should think" (for example, positive eugenics should be prohibited) about these challenging problems.
I better stop this here, since it is getting too lengthy. The arguments might resemble the egg Columbus used to demonstrate his idea of a round world, but in this book, Mr. Tateiwa's arguments are down to earth; a thought process develops, and even exceeds, the in-depth arguments made in the arguments. In my view, Mr. Tateiwa's On Personal Property is the best book available in the field of "bioethics" debate (including my own works). In a narrow sense, I have no doubt that the book, as a literary work, contains a subtle range beyond bioethical arguments. Various questions burst forth from the book. First, the statements, "What I made is mine" and "My body is mine" are contradictory, yet they do not hold absolute ground. Instead, we find our senses penetrated by these two statements. They do contain certain truths that make them difficult to abolish. Furthermore, this book allows the readers to reexamine the difficulty of abolishing the "Theory of Personal Property." Next, the idea, "if every thing in life ran smoothly, then the world will be a boring place," is a desire for other in the deepest sense, and it is important to realize whether or not it can be trusted as the starting point. I must apologize, beforehand, to readers for using the following bad example. When I was in high school, my friend's father was quite successful with his tennis club business. My friend's future was often brought up in discussion among other friends. We agreed that his future was rosy. Even though the thought of that type of fixed life would make me feel sick to my stomach, I used to say with a sigh, "Wow! What a bright life he has."
Let me talk about the topic of the "problem of the lifeboat" on page 412. We see the argument, ".. in the ocean, for example, let us say unless one of them leaves that boat, that boat would sink. Are there any differences in deciding who should jump off the boat by drawing lots or choosing a person with disabled attributes to jump off the boat? At this point, one may say there is a difference, and it is hard for them to make the choice for the latter to jump off the boat." On this occasion, for example, there are old men and children in that boat. If I was an old man in the boat, I might jump off the boat to save the young children. This is not the action of heroic or hopelessness. Rather, it seems that it is right, as in, "No, no, that is okay, you just go right ahead." Thus, we clearly see a difference, but I do not think we should go with the opinion, "it is hard to accept the latter." Is it necessary to shift the foundation of this argument? Whether or not the issue of "attribution" is taken abstractedly, if we were to fall into the same situation, we would observe changes depending upon who agreed with whom during the original act. In addition, the inner distribution of "attribution" is not evenly distributed. Some might point out that there are differences between allowable or non-allowable actions. This book leaves a lot of room for debate. Thus, those who argue bioethical issues will find reason to criticize this book, and they will proceed with their arguments.
Friday, March 6, 1998
This is the additional thought to add to yesterday's note. I skipped an essential part of why respect, in the sense of "enjoy others," can support the protection of the right to self-decision. Encompassing that point, I would like to add some more thoughts to my review.
A sense of "accept other" does not mean that, it firmly exist in us. Rather, we experience it daily as a sense of reality in "control others" by "wishing to do upon others as we wish." Our desires toward control match the desire of private possession. In short, it is nothing but our own desires, "What is mine is mine, what is others is also mine."
Then, some might state the issue of "accepting other" is nothing but introducing another fairly tale. However, this is not so. As our own possession (yes it does exist within us), we are not able to bring it forward as is. But, we can bring the statement forward as an issue that is contradictory. When we are able to get to the bottom of the matter, this issue seems to exist in the negative form.
Certainly we wish to do upon others as "we wish." If this can be actualized, then what would happen; it might bring us more enjoyment. From a heterosexual' viewpoint, he can do anything he wants to women (it does not have to be all women); this might be a commonly shared, strong desire for men (What! I am the only man who thinks that!). Anyway, a heterosexual male doing what he wants does not mean sexual assault. In regard to the action of sexual assaults, potential resistance exists; if resistance does not exists, then it is not sexual assault. For all that, a man's violence is still carried through the act. The "control" that we are talking about covers one usurping the possibility of such resistance beforehand, and it is a more fundamental authority. That is, the fundamental authority is forcing everything to go as one indicates. That is why the aforementioned situation makes it impossible (beforehand) to excuse the concept of sexual assault.
There is more to this issue. When we talk about sexual relationship, there is a possibility that no love is involved in the relationship. In the perfect world that guarantees my desire, if a desired person also desires me, then there is no need for me to gain the person's attention or worry if the person likes me; it is a meaningless issue. If the phenomena of sex, as Thomas Nagel argues ("Sexual Perversion," translated by Hitoshi Nagai, "What it is Like to be a Bat," published by Keiso Shobo) is a stratified "mutual acknowledgment" of a relationship of one's desire for and within each other, and sex is the essence of that relationship, then in the world where such a contingency does not exist, at least with a humanistic meaning of the sexes, sex would not exist.
My intention might already be clear to the readers. A situation occurs when the desire of "controlling other" is carried through and meant eliminating "other" of the inherent meaning. It becomes certain when one thinks a little closer to the issue. Others are who are out-casts of the world of self, or who have an existence that is not controlled. Therefore, desiring to control other is, in itself, meaningful when we presuppose the existence of other is not a controllable other. That is why other cannot carry through; desire to control is also conditioned by the previous stage of "enjoy other"
As such, in the book On Personal Property, "do not control other" is the fundamental desire, and thus, this location is the common ground for the establishment of ethics. This is exactly what connects the protection of the right to self-decision. What is important is Mr. Tateiwa's statement of "self" used in self-decision, which is actually "other." That is to say, in order to guarantee the desire of "enjoy (ing) other," one must protect the existence of "self" called "other." Reversing this, as well as my "self" who is writing this review, we must also be protected by the ethical postulation of "enjoy other." But, and this is first and foremost, this statement is reversed from the previous composition, thus, in itself, it is not a starting point. Generally speaking, "other" always precedes "self." At this point, often "other" confronts "self," but "other" does not hold the position that would eliminate "self." Rather, it is often thought of as the condition of existence, "self." Those who cannot be controlled by me (uncontrollable) means, for me, that uncontrollable may be other, but other can only be assumed as "self," this assumed "self," who is other, should not have the privilege to violate "my" realm. This is the composition of Mr. Tateiwa's "protect the right to self-decision."
I have been reconstructing this review too much, and I must apologize if I am not articulating my thoughts thoroughly. Mr. Tateiwa has been articulating his thoughts, as much as is possible, in everyday easy to understand terms. His style of articulation, unless my interpretation is incorrect, is similar to Jack Lacan's Narcissism theory, which is a psychoanalysis ego theory. As long as "other" (other with a small letter) has its own desire, then the existence expressed by "other" is the unrecoverable image that I offered. Instead, however, it is seized as a "hole" in the middle. (This is an example of "object ". For related information, refer to J. Lacan, Le Seminaire XX, Encore. Seuil 1975. For a practical guidebook, refer to J. D. Enseignement de 7 concepts cruciaux de la psychanalyse, by Jun-David Nasio, Shinyo-sha.) Actually, Mr. Tateiwa cautiously avoids the term "desire," and instead uses the term "sense," which is more commonly used in every day life. Different from the original direction of Mr. Tateiwa's arguments, one may read this book as an analysis of human relationships. It might be quite interesting to refer to psychoanalysis when we measure the book's theoretical range. If we continue reading this book, then we will probably arrive at Freud's life drive/ death drive on the "equinox of pleasure principal," of hard to understand arguments. But let me talk about this issue elsewhere.
It is also worth noting that, an image of "control of other" is not that desirable, and the argument is extremely well articulated in the story of "Dictator Switch" in Doraemon (a Japanese animated story). Azusa Nakajima wrote a book review on "Communication Failure Syndromes" by referring to the Doraemon story, but I was unable to locate the file of the reviews. Anyway, the story overlaps with Levinas' interpretation of Yoshiyuki Koizumi's, "Mourning of Philosophy" Kawade Shobo Shinsha), however, I will discuss this issue elsewhere, as well.
(3/6/87 8:57 P.M.)
*Shuichi Kato(Sociology) (in Japanese)
◆"Being an Ordinary Person" (Reading Life by a Different Author Every Time)
Book Review of Shinya Tateiwa's On Personal Property
By Satoru Saishu（最首 悟）
Shukan Asahi, 132-133, March 6, 1998
"… Self-denial meant, emancipation from 'I am such and such….'. A non-regulatory of the 'ordinary person' seems deeply moving into me. Related to this issue, last year's great books of the harvest were 'Outside of the Japanese language' by Yoshio Kataoka (Chikuma Shobo), in which the author wrote, 'It is hard to find the English 'I' in Japanese' and 'On Personal Property' by Shinya Tateiwa (Keiso Shobo), in which the author states that 'Self-decision and Personal Possession are not divisible.'" With the latter book, in particular, I share the same feelings as the author when he sates his book is simple and honest (pp. 132). The terms such as self and active rules by others are, for the most part, filled with artificiality…"
◆Book Review on "Live Lives as Other by Other" in On Personal Property (From the World: 8),
Kikan Fukushi Rodo 78:104-105
By Osamu Nagase（長瀬 修）
A publication of On Personal Property by Shinya Tateiwa, published by Keiso Shobo, was one of the major publication events in Japan in 1997. In 1990, Tateiwa, along with co-authors Junko Asaka, Masayuki Okahara, and Fumiya Onaka, wrote "Sei no Giho" (Technique of Life), which was published by Fujiwara Shoten. Tateiwa, shocked the bioethics audience with his refreshing thoughts, which he summed up after he co-authored the book.
In the preface, Tateiwa states, "We seem to face several contradictions in the issues of self-decision, reproductive technology, and eugenics. Even then, there seem to be arguments, aside from these contradictions, that permit the contradictory thoughts. What are they, then? I will search for the answers in this book." He then clarifies the aim of the book by stating, "Along with the arguments, I will demonstrate my search for the answers in a detailed manner. I came to these conclusions because I was unsatisfied in these areas of study."
Some might be puzzled by the title of the book, On Personal Property. Related to query against "meritocracy," which was brought forward by the Disabled Movement in Japan, the book attempted to discuss the issue, "I am the one who makes the results of my work, mine." The book is concerned with the issues of private possession and discusses one's ability to decide (self-decision) what to do. Thus, the popular issue "the right to self-decision" is also another subject in this book.
Not counting the pages in index, the book is an erudite tome with over 400 pages. The readers may start the book from chapter one, "The Subject called Personal Possession," but it is possible to overexert oneself by reading the book sequentially. A better way of reading this book might be to start from the last chapter (chapter nine), "Meet with a Rightful Eugenics," in which the author raises the issues of "prenatal diagnosis" and "abortion by choice." As we all know, these issues are currently hot topics with the Health and Welfare Council Evaluation and Promotion for Medical Technologies at the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
Regarding the issue of prenatal diagnosis, Tateiwa sees the "… right not to choose as a positive right," (page 416) is important, and on positive eugenics, he states, "Other should not be there for the purpose of our convenience" (page 421). I can identify the most parts of the assertion, but as for parental relationship, such as when I think about the example of a dwarf mother who wishes to have a dwarf child, there is an occasion that a woman seeks to use reproductive technologies in order to produce a child. How then, such an assertion be presented and well informed to parents with non-disabled or to parents with disabilities? I am deeply troubled with this issue. At one time, we thought that technologies should be applied to everyone. This example may not be a good one, but let us look at the one child policy of China. This policy would not apply to a minority race, where we might be faced with the assertion, "There is a different measure for minority group." It is often the case that the majority benefits from a result, when in actuality, the majority and minority simply applies the same standard. This might be because the relationship between the majority and minority is asymmetry.
I am fully aware of Tateiwa being "unsatisfied" with such arguments, and "ending the arguments by stating that such and such are difficult problems that do exist." At this moment in time, however, I have no answer to this. Another issue of concern is the author's statement that one should "not confirm the problems of 'fetus's right to live." At the same time, however, he states (page 415), "It may be possible that it is a 'privacy right' of that child (potential child)." It is quite possible that the issue might slides toward to the danger of the "Theory of Right for the Fetus." Another characteristic of On Personal Property is the section of notes, which is teeming with information. Actually, because the notes are comprised with interesting material, I often spent too much time reading them, forgetting to return to the main body of the book. The readers might also go to the book's index, find a particular theme, and start reading from that point. On the Web site, "Life, Human, and Society" http://itass01.shinshu-u.ac.jp:76/TATEIWA/1.HTM, the author offers information that relates to the book.
In "Gendai Shiso," Feb., 1998, which made up of a special edition of "People with Physical Impairment," in the section of "1970 Publications," Tateiwa speaks, in part, of how he arrived at the background for his book. Please refer to that article for more information.
In deed, On Personal Property is an expensive book, priced at 6000 Yen. It is time consuming and takes quite a bit of energy to read the book in its entirety. Nevertheless, the book, is a "must have" when you think about human lives and disabilities. This book speaks for itself and is indicative of the copious amounts of information, research, and ideas derived from a person spending ten years writing on the same theme. Being able to read this book in Japanese is one of the greater pleasures of living in a Japanese world.
While putting his efforts into examining various sociological issues, he made a series of publications regarding "Current Independent Living Movements," from No. 55, 1992 to No. 70, 1996 in the magazine "Kikan Fukushi Rodo." I wish to express my respect towards Tateiwa for his steadfast examination of current policy trends and policy issues, to include nursing care insurance and nursing care guidelines.
(Note: The author omitted all titles in is article.)
* Osamu Nagase (Tokyo University)(in Japanese)
◆Monthly Begin 53 (1998-3):6 (People with Disabilities Information Network)
"A Place of Connections" (I Have Read this Book) March 26, 1998,
Book Review for On Personal Property, by Noriko Seyama（瀬山 紀子）
An accidental meeting with a woman with cerebral palsy was the final straw for me to become involved with the lives and cares of disabled people. This woman made me realize that I have been dealing with the action of "does not deal."
When this woman's child was still in nursery school, she stood in front of the children and said, "I look like a monster, don't I. It's okay for me to be called a monster. I'm sure every one thinks of a person like me, with a strange shattered voice, is a monster." "Respect the sameness" is a concept where differences are thought of as no difference. By identifying herself as a "monster-like" person, she emphasizes the difference, rather than emphasizing her sameness. That is her way of resisting society's attitude. Attempts to connect social movements made by disabled people and the issues that she and other disabled people raised in the 1970s, as well as attempts to find detailed solutions to these issues, can be found in Mr. Tateiwa's On Personal Property.
While social movements of people with disabilities seek equal opportunity, we also have risky opinions, where some believe that the system that treat disabled people the same as normal, healthy people is a good system. By understanding and living in the current situation, the book offers us one of the directions that are critical to our involvement in the problem.