Sanctity of LifeSOL
Keiserling, Edward W. 1983 "Sanctity of Life and Quality of Life: Are They Compatible?", Grregg ed.  1988 Kato ; Iida eds. [1988:3-18] <365>
Tsukazaki, Ssatoshi(Λθ q) 1996 "The Problem of Sanctity of Life and Quality of Life: Relating Kantian Philosophy"(uΆ½Μ_Ή«ΖΆ½ΜΏΜβθ\\JgNwΙΦAΓ―Δv), Tsuchiyama et al. eds. [1996:107-124] <365>
Tateiwa, Shinya(§β ^η)@2016@On Private Property, English Version, Kyoto Books
§β ^η@2013/05/20@wIL_ ζQΕxCΆ@EΆΙΕC973p.@ISBN-10: 4865000062@ISBN-13: 978-4865000061@1800+@mamazonn^mkinokuniyan@¦
§β ^η@1997/09/05@wIL_xC€[C445+66p.@ISBN-10: 4326601175@ISBN-13: 978-4326601172@6300@mamazonn^mkinokuniyan@¦
@Chap.5.4.4 Ownership and Qualifications
@"Third, in Chapter 7 Section 3 I will address opposition to intervention, and look at demands for a subject that is able to argue against or oppose intervention. Here "qualifications" will again be discussed. This is related to arguments over "Sanctity of Life (SOL)" versus "Quality of Life (QOL)." These two ideas are compared and contrasted with each other, the standard approach being that while the former, a more traditional approach, points out the "dangers" of the latter, at the same time it is impossible to ignore the latter (as a form of opposition) when we consider the "simple prolongation of life." It can presumably be said that when something is alive, the higher its quality of life the better. Depending on their circumstances, a person may want to be left as they are without receiving treatment that prolongs their life but does not improve it, and there are no doubt cases in which these desires of the person in question may be accepted by those around them. This does not mean, however, that it is acceptable for those whose quality of life is seen as inferior to cease to exist. But this kind of connection is made nevertheless. When this occurs the argument becomes crude and the dichotomy employed overly broad. It makes no sense to use "quality of life" as it is perceived by the person in question themselves as a qualification or condition of their own survival. Arguments surrounding "quality of life," however, sometimes get tangled up with arguments involving "qualifications for life," either through the distinction between them not being made clearly enough or through a "quality of life" being established in advance and then used as a "qualification" (of being a citizen, for example)◆24."
@"Other texts such as Masia [1985a:59-] [1985b:163-167] [1987:61] refer to the "Johns Hopkins Hospital case" in which the parents of a baby born with Down's syndrome and a closed duodenum did not agree to surgery and the child died 15 days after being born (see also Weir  and Kawai [1989:242]). Masia asserts that there were errors in the assessment of "quality of life" in this case, and that "labeling this child's quality of life as 'low' and allowing him to die can only be viewed as weeding out the weak." Regarding the Howl case, on the other hand, in which a child with a deformed left side, abnormal trachea/esophagus, and other health issues died after surgery was performed by court order (in opposition to the parents and at the recommendation of a group of doctors), Masia states that it "is a case in which it would be better to allow the child to die naturally rather than engage in futile efforts to prolong his life" and "the idea of the 'sanctity of life' has been misapplied" (Masia [1985b:164-166]). In response to this, Inoue writes, "There are unavoidable questions about his [Masia's] views in relation to the distinction between these two cases" (Inoue [1987:48-49]). "
@""Philosophers like Kant are cited by those who attempt to assert the "dignity" of each individual in opposition to utilitarianism. I understand why this approach is taken. Because of the invocation of the idea of the "person," however, there is not such big difference between the two viewpoints. Keiserlingk, for example, states that there is no contradiction between "Quality of Life (QOL)" and "Sanctity of Life (SOL)" (Keiserlingk ), and while, as Kurosaki points out, this compatibility is achieved by altering the concept of SOL to bring it in line with an approach based on QOL (Kurosaki 19871991]), this sort of manipulation is often carried out. Kant and bioethics are discussed in Tsuchiyama ed. . In Inoue  it is claimed that Keiserlingk's perspective is that of Kant (see also Tsukasaki ), and in Hirata  it is asserted that Kantian ethics are fundamentally based on a QOL perspective. In Tarui , on the other hand, it is asserted that the Kantian view does not require that some appropriate level of ability be present in individuals: "Rights, according to Kant, amount to an 'assumed' relationship between members of a community, a 'relationship between each individual and all other individuals' in which each person accepts an obligation to protect and not to harm other individuals, even those who lack (as most people do) the 'empirical' ability to maintain their own lives and resources" (Tarui [1996:61]. See also the symposium summary in Oguma ). I do not deny that this kind of interpretation is possible. If this approach is taken, however, the question of what is being designated as the subject of rights and what is being designated as the object of ownership arises (cf. Chapter 2 Note 4). For an examination of the arguments of Kant and Hare, see Niita  . On Engelhardt's criticisms of Kant's writings concerning suicide/deontology, see Marutani . On "autonomy" and "enlightenment," see Tanida . On the relationship between Kant and bioethics in the English speaking world, see Kurata . Related issues are also discussed in Sections 3 to 5 of Chapter 7."