■Who
◆Cohen, G. A.（G. A.コーエン）
◆Hegel, Friedrich（フリードリッヒ・ヘーゲル）
◆Locke, John（ジョン・ロック）
◆Kawamoto, Takashi（川本 隆史）
◆Morimura, Susumu（森村 進）
◆Nozick, Robert（ロバート・ノージック）
◆Okawa, Masahiko（大川 正彦）
◆Tateiwa, Shin'ya（立岩 真也）
■
◆Locke, John 1689 Two Treatises of Government＝1968 鵜飼信成訳, 『市民政府論』，岩波文庫
“Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.” (Locke 1689=1868:32-33; 1988:287-288,sec.27, cited in Tateiwa 1997:25)
■Kant, Immanuel 1764/65 "Bemerken zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schöne und Erhabenen"＝1966 tr. by Owatari, Tatsuo (尾渡 達雄)，The Complete Works of Kant, Vol.16 :259-355，Risosha (理想社), ＝2011 tr. by Frierson, Patrick and Guyer, Paul Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other Writings,Cambridge University Press, 399p. ASIN: B004W66OHQ ［amazon］ <24>
"The body is mine for it is a part of my I and is moved by my faculty of choice (Willkur) The entire animated or unanimated world that does not have its own faculty of choice is mine, in so far as I can compel it and move it according
to my faculty of choice. The sun is not mine. The same holds for another human being, therefore nobody's property is a Proprietat or an exclusive property. But in so far as I want to appropriate something exclusively to myself, I will, at least, not presuppose the other's will or his actions as being opposed to mine. I will therefore perform those actions that designate what is mine, cut down the tree, mill it, etc. The other human being tells me that this is his, for throuhg the actions of his faculty of choice, it belongs to his own self, as it were."(Kant 1764/65=1966:309, =2011:110, cited in Tateiwa 1997:1→2013:24)
cf. tr. by Miyasato "My body belongs to me. That is because my body is part of my ego and is driven by my will. As long as I can coerce it and move it around with my will, the world that has no individual will or the entire inanimate world is mine. The sun is not mine. The same is true of other human beings. Thus, any proprietary rights (proprietas) are not exclusively a proprietary right. However, as long as I desire to exclusively own a certain thing, at least I would not presuppose others' will as being against my own will, nor would I presuppose that action is contrary to my own action. Therefore, I will implement the actions that symbolize my own possessions, like cutting trees; I would work these into various things. Other might say to me, "That is mine." That is because it belongs to me by my actions of selective will." (Kant 1764/65=1966:309, cited in Tateiwa 1997:1)
◆Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedlich 1821 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts＝1967 藤野渉・赤澤正敏訳，『法の哲学』，岩崎武雄（責任編集）『ヘーゲル』 (世界の名著 35):149-604＝1983 高峰一愚訳，『法の哲学――自然法と国家学』，論創社，362+6p. <32>
"Man, pursuant to his immediate existence within himself, is something natural, external to his concept. It is only through the development of his own body and mind, essentially through his self-consciousness's apprehension of itself as free, that he takes possession of himself and becomes his own property and no one else's " (Hegel 1821=1952:26, Sec.57, cited in Tateiwa 1997:32)
◆Marcel, Gabriel 1935 Etre et avoir, Aubier＝1976 山本信訳「存在と所有」，『ヤスパース／マルセル』，中央公論社，世界の名著続13
◆Macpherson, C.B. 1962 The Political Theory of Possesive Individualism,Oxford Univ. Press＝1980 藤野渉・将積茂・瀬沼長一郎訳，『所有的個人主義の政治理論』，合同出版 ，358p.
◆Nozick, Robert 1974 Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books＝1985,1989 嶋津格訳，『アナーキー・国家・ユートピア――国家の正当性とその限界』，木鐸社，上256p.下280p.＝199411 嶋津 格訳，木鐸社，564p. ISBN-10: 4833221705 ISBN-13: 978-4833221702 ［amazon］／［kinokuniya］ p0601. p08.
"(Our main conclusions about the state are that) a minimal state, limited to the narrow function of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate a person's right not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified." (Nozick 1974:ix=1985:i, cited in Tateiwa 1997:32)
◆Wolff, Jonathan 1991 Nozick : Property, Justice and Minimal State, Basil Blackwell＝1994 森村進・森村たまき訳，『ノージック――所有・正義・最小国家』，勁草書房，307+18p.
◆ TATEIWA Shin'ya September 1997 On Private Property （『私的所有論』）, Tokyo, Keiso-Shobo 445+66p ISBN-10: 4326601175 ISBN-13: 978-4326601172 6300yen [amazon]/[kinokuniya]
from Chapter 1, Translation by Robert Chapeskie
"What do I own? In other words (see the discussion above), over what do I posses the right of determination? In considering only the right of self determination we may not normally be aware of this sort of question. This is because in most cases it is understood from the start what sorts of things we ought to have the right to determine ourselves. In practice, of course, these rights are not always recognized; patients have not had the right of self determination in regard to their own medical care, and disabled people have been stripped of many of their rights of self determination. These are problems that are currently receiving attention within Japanese society. For people who desire reform in this area, however, the meaning of "matters related to myself" is generally understood to be concretely defined in sentences like "I should have the right to decide in matters related to myself". It is taken as self-evident. But what is it that belongs to me? Someone decides, and if we call these various deciding agents "selves", what is it that each of these selves is to be given the right to decide? What sorts of things should I be able to decide for myself? In other words, what is it that I own? Without an answer to this question the term "self determination" is meaningless. For example, if the "I" in "I should have the right to decide in matters related to myself" refers only to me, the author of this book, then everyone in the world must do as I say. To say "I should have the right to decide in matters related to myself" raises the question of what constitutes "matters related to myself", that is, what is their scope or limit. There is then also the question of why this limit should serve as a basis for self determination. Private ownership, and ownership itself, are therefore concepts that require further consideration.
Some might suggest that who owns what, and by extension what it is that the rights of each individual ought to apply to, is already clear. For me at least, however, this is not the case; the extremely normal workings of this society are themselves problematic. Is it really clear that "the results of my labor should belong to me"? At the same time, is there any way for us to get away from this idea? There are those who have said that this system imparts an unfair disadvantage to people whose poor mental or physical condition makes it impossible for them to be productive. This actually is the case in our society, and it is completely validabsolutely correct to point this out; this fact is part of the basic structure of our society and as a result this claim of unfairness is a fundamental criticism of how our society is constructed. But where has this criticism lead in the end? It deals with such a fundamental issue that finding a way to address it has proved difficult. It is a question that seems left over from a much earlier era, but in fact it has not been around that long, having first received attention in Japan around 1970, where right from the start it was presented as a more or less irresolvable problem. I observed the emergence of this intractable issue first hand, but I was dissatisfied with its lack of resolution and decided to consider it further. Another narrative that emerged was the conclusion that after various other systems had been tried the "market economy" was the only viable option and should be pursued; any problems it might pose could be solved through methods like creating a "welfare state". But should this really be the end of debate on the question of the fundamental economic system? I can'tnot accept this assertion of uncomplicated resolution with no further conflict. But neither can I also can't side with those who wantonly criticize the system without presenting a solution; i. If we take issue with meritocratic systems based on capability and performance, can we really just do away with them? What can we propose to replaceing them with?
To what extent, then, has this issue already been considered?" (Tateiwa 1997:3-4)
◆Cohen, Gerald Allan 2000 If you're an Egalitarian, How Come you're So Rich?, Harvard University Press, 256p.（Hardcover: 256 pages June 3, 2000) ISBN: 0674002180 ［amazon］＝20061031 渡辺 雅男・佐山 圭司 訳，『あなたが平等主義者なら、どうしてそんなにお金持ちなのですか』，こぶし書房，409p. ASIN: 4875592116 4830 ［amazon］／［kinokuniya］ ※ p08.
→立岩 真也 2006/12/15「二〇〇六年の収穫」，『週刊読書人』
◆Murphy, Liam B. and Thomas Nagel 2002 The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, Oxford Univ Pr, 228p. ASIN: 0195176561 (pb 2004/12/9) ［amazon］＝20061110 伊藤恭彦訳，『税と正義』，名古屋大学出版会，255p. ASIN: 4815805482 4725 ［amazon］／［kinokuniya］ ※,
UP:20091216 REV:20140918