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žResolution from Self Advocates' Meeting at the 48th National Convention of Inclusion Japan
@31 July- 1 August 1999, Sapporo

žToshimitsu, Keiko
žYamamoto, Yumiko

[2009]

žToshimitsu, Keiko March 31, 2009 "The Background to Changes in the Framework of Permission for Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in Japan" Core Ethics 5: 229-240 [abstract] (http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/gr/gsce/ce/ce5engtext.htm#19)


žKato, Masae@2009@Women's Rights?: The Politics of Eugenic Abortion in Modern Japan, Amsterdam Univ. Press, 245p.@ISBN-10: 9053567933@ISBN-13: 978-9053567937@mamazonn^mkinokuniyan@¦ be. p01.

[2008]

žToshimitsu, Keiko March 2008 "The Arguments in Japan over Preimplantaion Genetic Daignosis in the 1990s," Treatment & Life and Ethics & Society 7: 67-85 Osaka University Graduate School of Medicine

žToshimitsu, Keiko March 31, 2008 "The Arguments in Japan over Preimplantaion Genetic Daignosis in the 1990s", Core Ethics 4:193-211 [abstract]

ž July 12, 2008 "Over Prenatal Diagnosis", Ritsumeikan University

žToshimitsu, Keiko July 12, 2008 Report "Over Prenatal Diagnosis", Ritsumeikan University

žYamamoto, Yumiko September 2008 ""Medical Treatment to Fetus" and "Self-determination of Women" in Prenatal Diagnosis: Referring to Questionnaire to Midwife,"Seimei Rinri 18(1), Japan Association for Bioethics

žYamamoto, Yumiko November 30, 2008 "Current Conditions and Challenges in Prenatal Diagnosis and Midwife's Activities: Crossing Gender Bias," The 20th Annual Convention of Japan Association for Bioethics

[2007]

žYamamoto, Yumiko February 20, 2008 "Realities of Prenatal Diagnosis and Crisis of IVG from "Abnormal" Fetuses in France : Since the Perruche Judgement" Nanzan University Institute for Social Ethics, The 1st Incentive Award for Social Ethic Studies, Shortlisted Thesis

žToshimitsu, Keiko March 21, 2007 "Conflict over Selection of Fertilized Eggs," Preparatory Doctoral Thesis, Graduate School of Core Ethics and Frontier Sciences, Ritsumeikan University

žToshimitsu, Keiko March 31, 2007 "Movements over Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis of Fertilized Ovum Within Japan: Year 1992-2006" Birth 1:155-171

žYamamoto, Yumiko September 20, 2007 "Realities of Prenatal Diagnosis and Crisis of IVG from "Abnormal" Fetuses in France : Since the Perruche Judgement" Seimei Rinri 17(1),233/240 Japan Association for Bioethics

žToshimitsu, Keiko November 11, 2007 "The Arguments in Japan over Preimplantaion Genetic Daignosis in the 1990s" The 19th Meeting of Japan Association for Bioethics


ž Lafleur, William R. ; Bohme, Gernot ; Shimazono, Susumui“‡‰’ ij eds. 2007@Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research, Indiana Univ. Press, 280p., Bioethics and the Humanities@ISBN-10: 0253348722@ISBN-13: 978-0253348722

*****Under Construction*****

[1997]

žTateiwa, Shinya 1997 On Private Property(Shiteki-Shoyu Ron), Tokyo, Keiso-Shobo
Chapter 9 "Dealing with correct forms of eugenics" (translation by Robert Chapeskie)

What are the things we can decide while the other does not yet exist? There is, for example, the technology of "prenatal diagnosis"(1) and the practice of "selective abortion": a fetus is examined before birth and if it is found to have or be very likely to have a disability or illness it is aborted. I will consider issues related to this kind of practice in sections one through five.

In section one I look at the issue from both the perspective of women and that of disabled people and determine where exactly problems may arise. In section two I examine assertions of "women's rights". To decide whether or not to bring a new being into the world is not the same as to decide what sort of being that being will be. The decision itself is taken before the other exists, but it is nonetheless taken based on the assumption of the other in question existing as an other. Here I state that the object of the decision does not exist within the domain of the "self" and therefore cannot be said to be an object of the woman in question's self determination. In section three I examine assertions which are (claimed to be) made from the perspective of the person (fetus) in question. To begin with I state that the argument for justification based on the "unhappiness" of the person in question is not tenable. This is something which has been asserted within the disabled movement and is one of the points on which the women's movement has been based but has nevertheless not been widely understood. I introduce several arguments to supplement this assertion. At the same time I also state that the sort of practices in question cannot be said to be murder in the literal sense of the word and that the argument that they must be prohibited as instances of murder is not convincing. If the above can be claimed we then have no choice but to consider this issue as people existing within this society. In section four I look at why people may want to employ selective abortion. I state that for one thing this is an action an individual may carry out in order to get rid of something which they themselves find inconvenient, and I then examine the question of what it means to think about the suffering of the person (fetus) in question. In section five I discuss what can be concluded from what is stated in the earlier sections.

In section six I examine "positive eugenics". Here I suggest that the rejection of a "correct" positive eugenics which involves neither violence nor misconceptions regarding empirical facts is just as difficult if not in fact more difficult than in the case of passive eugenics. If positive eugenics can indeed be criticized I consider how this might be attempted. In section seven I augment several of the points raised in this chapter. Here I discuss, for example, the limits of what can be considered the target of criticism if only the state is considered to be an agent of eugenics.

1 Prenatal diagnosis

1-1 Prenatal diagnosis

This is indeed a difficult issue. Our morality is based the idea that everyone should be allowed to live happily and that human rights should be protected, but in this case the application of these concepts is not straightforward. We cannot simply say that the difficulty here arises from the debate grinding to a halt in the face of the intractable nature of the conflict between a disabled person's right to live and a woman's right to self determination regarding whether or not she gives birth. Before this antinomy arises whether or not the issue should be framed in this way can itself be questioned.

Here "the other" does not exist, or perhaps could be better described as being in the process of moving from not existing to existing. The decision in question is made "before" this being begins to exist as an other. When the decision is made the person in question does not exist. If so, does the right to decide not then belong to the parents? And since one part of selective abortion is abortion itself, if the latter is permissable then shouldn't the former be permissable as well? Abortion in general is something which is ultimately carried out based on the interests or preferences of the parents (people who are already alive). The same can be said of selective abortion. There can be thought of as being no difference between the interests upheld in both cases. Furthermore, since selective abortions are carried out based on the circumstances of the being who would be born, as opposed to regular abortions which are carried out based on the preferences of the person who would give birth, can they not then in fact be thought of as more ethical or humane?

One criticism which may be applied to them is that they constitute an instance of eugenics. What were the problems with eugenics, both historically and as it exists today (see chapter six section three)? One problem was that most of the postulated genetic factors were in fact mistaken. There were, however, some aspects of the understanding of genetics which were not incorrect, and some changes and eradications could in fact be carried out based on this correct understanding. Another problem was that eugenics involved violence. But in this case what occurs is not violence. Here there is neither murder nor coercion. If so what objections are left? The increasing of things which are good and decreasing of things which are not good is itself a good thing. This being the case this kind of criticism would appear to be mistaken or perverted. It would seem to be very difficult to criticize this kind of "correct" eugenics. While following the second world war eugenics came to be seen in a bad light due to its connection to Nazism and racism and as a result lost some of its pre-war impetus, it is not as though these assertions have completely disappeared and there are now no eugenic policies/practices being conducted. On the contrary, I think it can be said that it was only in the 1970s that criticism began to focus on ability and the lack of ability (disability), or in other words on the "essence" of eugenics (which is itself not unrelated to the issue of prenatal testing - see chapter six notes 44 and 45). Criticism of eugenics itself becomes problematic when it arrives at this point(2).

It is sometimes claimed that eugenics involves interferring with what is "inviolable". But this term says nothing when used on its own. To begin with, if what is being claimed is that interference/modification is impossible as a matter of fact, then since this kind of intervention is in fact already possible this claim should clearly be rejected. Second, if what is being offered as a reason to refrain from this kind of intervention is that it was impossible in the past we must then ask why this past state of affairs should be preferred. Third, if what is being claimed is that these things should or must be considered inviolable, then what is being stated here is only this conclusion without any basis for why it should be accepted being provided. Fourth, the term "inviolable" might presumably include the meaning "important". But can the existence of a disability, for example, be considered "important"?

This is related to the many things which have not been sufficiently debated in relation to decision making and discrimination. This is not the only topic which has not seen much discussion: little has been said concerning how we should consider the determination of the "value" or "quality" of human beings, one of the most important questions of the current era. Since I am uncomfortable with simply repeating that these questions are difficult or that they are not being sufficiently discussed I have attempted to make some small amount of progress in this area. For every idea I had, however, I realized there were other ways of thinking which were also possible. The discussion below is quite varied but nonetheless represents only the start of one possible approach. There are many other things which must also be considered. It is my hope that this work can provide a jumping off point for future discussion and debate of these issues. It will not have been pointless if it facilitates the discovery of openings and inadequacies or a change of assumptions following which new debates and discussions can be pursued.

Article fourteen of Japan's Eugenic Protection Act states that " **** . When reforms of this law, which included the establishment of the so called "embryo clause" which states that ***** were tabled in 1972-73 they provoked strenuous opposition movements amongst both women and the disabled. At the same time assertions of a woman's right to choose made within the women's movement often conflicted sharply with the arguments being made by those in the disabled movement. The arguments put forward at this time and the conflicts between them remain with us today(3). There are also countries where prenatal testing is undertaken on a wider basis than in Japan, but that is not to say that it is carried out without criticism(4). To begin with I will establish what sorts of criticisms have been made of prenatal testing in Japan and I will then go on to examine what we can gain from them and what should be taken into consideration. When we look at the concrete statements which have been made we see that there are some which cannot be accepted in their current form. It cannot therefore be considered a valid approach to do nothing more than simply enumerate the various arguments which have been made or point out how they intertwine with each other. There are indeed important points to be raised here. We cannot ignore something just because it is problematic, and not ignoring these issues does not mean we have to accept all of them exactly as they have been stated in the past. I feel that it is necessary for us not only to point out what is lacking in these arguments but also to try to think about a way forward. Here I my approach will be to begin by establishing the fundamental aspects of the arguments critics have made and then examine, while considering what issues they have not addressed and why, what kinds of criticisms can continue to be made in the present and further developed in the future.

1-2 Criticisms of the disabled people's movement

1-3 Criticisms/responses of the women's movement

1-4 Unresolved issues

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