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>HOME Japanese Page * Tateiwa, Shinya 2009 Sole Life, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 418p. ISBN-10:4480867201 ISBN-13:978-4480867209 [amazon]/[kinokuniya] (Japanese)  Chapter 1. Saying / not saying the specialty of human life Section 1. Theory that new things are same as old things, thus are accepted 1. The role as tradition destroyer 2. Some say it is OK because it has already done Section 2. Alpha: Feeling and reason 1. Alpha: Feeling and reason 2. It is not the ethic of de-anthropocentrism or de-racism 3. It does not consider human life as special 4. Some say it is important, but they don't say why Section 3. Relationships 1. Calling for "somebody" 2. Difficulty of relation-ism 3. As if there were not such things as "Parents" Section 4. Another boundary Beta: The World / Internals 1. The World / Internals 2. Humans / Animals 3. Repetition * Tateiwa, Shin'ya 1997 On Private Property(Shiteki-Shoyu Ron), Tokyo, Keiso-Shobo  chapter 4 note 6 (translation by Robert Chapeskie) "Arguments of "anthropocentrism" have been raised in the field of "environmental ethics". For works on environmental ethics see Schrader-Frechette ed. [1991], Kato [1991] , Kamo and Tanimoto eds. [1994] and Kito [1996]. The Chiba University report mentioned in chapter one note seven lists many related texts. See also Kato and Iida eds. [1990:109-224] [1993:120-187], Iida ed. [1994:179-248], "Scientific Development and Contemporary Society II" planning and management committee ed. [1995:242-357] [1996:115-231]. Ohara ed. [1995] offers a selection of important texts in translation (for accompanying commentary see Kito [1995]). For other writings on the environment which advance "anthropocentrism" see Murakami [1984:340] [1992:60], Morioka [1988:63-80] and Sakura [1992:36]. One type of anthropocentrism, let us call it "anthropocentrism A" approaches nature from the perspective of resources needed for survival. This can be referred to as "pragmatic anthropocentrism" (Watanabe [1994]). To this end nature is modified, but in order to ensure survival nature must also (to a certain extent) be protected. In this sense "anthropocentric" environmental protection is conceivable and is in fact practiced (Murakami [1984], [1992] etc.; this obvious fact is pointed out by many writers in this field). What is stated here in regard to this view is another form of anthropocentrism, let us call it "anthropocentrism B" which places value on what is received from nature. We are clearly seeking both A and B forms of anthropocentrism at the same time, and it is possible for the desires they engender to conflict with each other. Which should be given priority and how is mediation between them to be conducted? Even if we can say something like "pursue each within feasible limits" this does not provide any kind of definitive resolution to these sorts of conflicts. "Anti-anthropocentric" and "non-anthropocentric" positions which assert that nature (the natural world of animals, plants, etc.) has "distinct" or "inherent" value have been taken in opposition to anthropocentrism. What (if any) conflicts exist between this assertion and the position I have stated? To begin with, if the natural environment did not exist it would be impossible for us to perceive it or acknowledge its value. In this sense nature (the various individual components of which it is comprised) might be said to have distinct, inherent value as something which exists independently. On the other hand, however, if I am asked who it is that acknowledges this value (and carries out actions based on this perception of value) the answer can only be I myself (or we ourselves). In this sense there is no conflict between assertions of "anthropocentrism" and "inherent value", and we are left with the sort of (unescapable and obvious) anthropocentrism I have just laid out. Let us call this "anthropocentrism Z". Another form of anthropocentrism (type C) which asserts that (while it has independent value) nature is without value or even harmful to humanity is also conceivable. If these perspectives (anthropocentrism A, B and C) are all conceivable, should we then say that they all lie within type Z? C can be said to conflict with A in that it asserts a nature which is useless to us and threatens our survival. Since B asserts that the existence of something other than the self (ourselves) in itself has value it can therefore include C (while this C within B conflicts with A). "Humanity desires nature as something which exists to us as an other. At times it appeals to us with its beauty and at other times threatens us with its destructive power. It exists to begin with unrelated to human intervention, and human beings desire to experience it as something which acts on its own and possesses its own characteristics and tendencies" (Maruyama [1995:274]. See also Maruyama [1994], Ikeda [1992]). In relation to the discussion above there has also been debate about attaching weight to the value of nature. Singer and others have advanced a doctrine of animal liberation based on the existence of sentience ("sentientism") (cf. chapter five note eight, Hiraishi [1994], Kito [1995]. For more on the idea that "living agents" have certain rights see also Reagan [1974] [1993], cf. Feinberg [1974][1980b] and Iida [1995]). It has also been claimed that it is important to view organisms, ecosystems, etc. as a whole. These two views have been seen as conflicting with each other, with proponents of the latter criticizing the former for its "individualism" and proponents of the former (among others) criticizing the latter for its "totalitarianism". Regarding the latter it has also been asserted that a distinction should be made between "organism" and "community" with the "community" approach being one which acknowledges the distinct value of each individual organism within nature (see Katz [1985]). These debates revolve around what should be assigned the most value (or whether all rankings in terms of value should be rejected), and obviously all of the positions taken fall within type Z anthropocentrism. It is also possible that from the perspective of type A anthropocentrism the ecosystem as a whole might be seen as important because of its connection to the survival of the human race, while on the other hand an ordering or ranking based on value may arise in type B anthropocentrism if it is impossible to eliminate the factor of "proximity" to the self - as a separate point it can be noted here that the view which holds that "(greater) value should be placed on creatures more similar to humans" can also be called a type of "anthropocentrism". There are also arguments for an "intergenerational ethics" in which we consider not only the people living today but also those who will live in the future. (For an assertion of "weak anthropocentrism" see Norton [1984]. For more on "anthropocentrism" and "anti-anthropocentrism" see Watanabe [1994] and Tanimoto [1995]. For a criticism of "inherent value" see Hamano [1994]. For an introduction to the "deep ecology" of Ness and others see Kikuchi [1994] and Morioka [1995b]. For an examination of the "holistic" approach see Kikuchi [1995]. For more on "intergenerational ethics" see Takahashi [1994] and Tanimoto [1994]. For examination and criticism of assertions of the "rights" of nature (living things) found in Stone [1972] and elsewhere see Ozawa [1990→1991] and Ikeda [1990b→1996a:90]. Here I will add a few remarks about the "rights" of living things. What can be said about them differs depending on how this term is defined. If the subject to which rights are assigned must be one capable of making rational decisions and responding to inquiries then the phrase "rights of living things" is inappropriate. If such qualifications are not needed in order to be said to possess rights, however, then the idea that living things have rights does not seem particularly strange. It can also been seen as an attempt to say that there are things which are not the self (things which the self should not be free to interfere with). This does not constitue an argument for this use of the word "right". To repeat what has already been stated the assignation of rights is something we ourselves carry out, and if the use of the word "right" in this context serves to obscure this fact it is inappropriate. For a more detailed discussion of this see the "environmental ethics" section on the website."(pp.165-167) * Singer, Peter * Kuhse, Helga UP: REV:September 3, 2009 ◇Philosophy & Ethics of Life / Bioethics |