The Political Economy of Terrorism

内容説明

The Political Economy of Terrorism presents a widely accessible approach to the study of terrorism that combines economic methods with political analysis and realities. It applies economic methodology - theoretical and empirical - with political analysis to the study of domestic and transnational terrorism. Included in the treatment are historical aspects of the phenomenon, a discussion of watershed events, the rise of modern-day terrorism, examination of current trends, the dilemma of liberal democracies, evaluation of counterterrorism, and analysis of hostage incidents. Rational-actor models of terrorist and government behavior and game-theoretic analysis are presented for readers with no prior theoretical training. Where relevant, the authors display graphs using the data set International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), and other data sets.

List of Tables and Figures
Preface
1 Terrorism: An Introduction
2 The Dilemma of Liberal Democracies
3 Statistical Studies and Terrorism Behavior
4 Counterterrorism
5 Transference
6 International Cooperation: Dilemma and Inhibitors
7 Hostage Taking
8 After 9/11
9 The Economic Impact of Transnational Terrorism
10 Homeland Security
11 The Future of Terrorism
References
Author Index
Subject Index
Tables and Figures

Tables
1.1 Some Terrorist Tactics
1.2 Historical Terrorist Campaigns
2.1 Odds Ration for Presence of Terrorist Group
2.2 Features Distinguishing Left-Wing from Fundamentalist Terrorists
3.1 Key Variables in ITERATE
3.2 Number of Incidents by Type (1968-2003): ITERATE
3.3 Cyclical Properties of the Terrorist Time Series
3.4 Impact of Metal Detectors on Skyjackings: Intervention Analysis
3.5 Interventions
5.1 Description of the Intervention Variables
5.2 Results of the VAR
6.1 Essential Asymmetries between Terrorists and Targeted Governments
6.2 Global and Regional Conventions and Treaties Relating to Controlling International Terrorism
6.3 International Efforts against the Funding of Terrorism
7.1 Select Key Hostage-Taking Incidents Prior to 1986
7.2 Select Hostages Captures during the 1982-1992 Lebanon Hostage Crisis
7.3 Select Hostages Captured during 2004 in Iraq
7.4 Significant Determinants of Various Aspects of Hostage Incidents
8.1 Summary Statistics of the Various Incident Types by Income Group
8.2 Summary Statistics of the Various Incident Types by Region
9.1 Insured Losses of Other Terrorist and Natural Disasters
10.1 Highlights of the USA Patriot Act(HR 3162)
10.2 Directorates and Mission Agencies of Homeland Security
10.3 Total Budget Authority by Organization as of 31 January 2004
10.4 Homeland versus Nonhomeland Security Funding Breakdown, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005
11.1 Potential Mass-Casualty Terrorist Attacks
11.2 Select Mass-Casualty Terrorist Attacks
11.3 Inhibiting and Promoting Factors Regarding Terrorists' Use of WMDs
11.4 Past Incidents of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism
Figures
2.1 Terrorism-civil liberties constraint
2.2 Indifference map for terrorism-civil liberties trade-off
2.3 Social equilibrium
2.4 Alternative equilibriums
2.5 Transnational terrorist incidents: 1968-2003
2.6 Proportion of US transnational terrorist incidents: 1978-2003
2.7 Suicide incidents: quarterly, 1981-2001
2.8 Victims of suicide: quarterly, 1981-2001
3.1 Annual number of sunspots
3.2 All incidents and bombings
3.3 Hostage takings and assassinations
3.4 Threats and hoaxes
3.5 Incidents with deaths and casualties
3.6 The proportion of lethal incidents
3.7 Suicide bombings in Israel
3.8 Typical intervention functions
3.9 US domestic transnational skyjackings
4.1 Terrorists' resource constraints
4.2 Prisoner's Dilemma
4.3 Chicken and assurance games
4.4 Two-target deterrence game
4.5 Six-nation preemption game
4.6 Asymmetric preemption game
4.7 Two-target deterrence game
4.8 Deterrence versus preemtion-symmetric case
4.9 Deterrence versus preemtion-asymmetric case
4.10 Weakest-link security risk
4.11 Best-shot security innovation
5.1 Expected utility of a potential skyjacker
5.2 Indifference curves for terrorist and nonterrorist actions
5.3 The optimal allocation
5.4 Increasing the cost of terrorist attacks
5.5 Reduction in terrorists' resources
5.6 Substitutability between attack models
5.7 Substitutions between attack models
6.1 Transnational external costs
6.2 Transnational external benefits
6.3 Prisoners' Dilemma viewed from period 2 of a two-period game
6.4 Freezing assets: coordination game
7.1 Percentage of hostage-taking missions
7.2 Game theory for hostage event
8.1 Proportion of incident types in the LIC group
8.2 Casually incidents by region
9.1 Macroeconomic variables and 9/11
9.2 Net capital stock held by foreigners in Spain
10.1 Organizational chart of the Department of Homeland Security