Deontology, Responsibility, And Equality
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper 200502 Museum Tusculanum，503p.
last update:20110704
■Lippert-rasmussen, Kasper 200502 Deontology, Responsibility, And Equality，Museum Tusculanum，503p. ISBN-10:8763502259 ISBN-13:978-8763502252 $61 [amazon]／[kinokuniya] ※ l04 dr01 nr03 e03
■内容
内容説明
Three questions that loom large in moral and political philosophy are these: Can deontological moral constraints be justified? When, if ever, are we morally responsible for what we do? How is the ideal of equality best configured? 'Deontology, Responsibility and Equality' deals with selected aspects of these three broad questions. It discusses critically certain attempts by Frances Kamm and Thomas Nagel (among others) to account for the impermissibility of minimising violations in terms of moral status. Also, it challenges the view that there is a morally relevant difference between doing and allowing harm and, especially, between killing and letting die. In relation to the second question, it concentrates on recent developments within compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility prompted by the work of Harry Frankfurt. It challenges his purported refutation of the principle of alternative possibilities as well as certain positive compatibilist, identification-based accounts of responsibility. Finally, with respect to the last question, the book focuses on how we should understand the ideal of equality of opportunity and the moral significance of the distinction between social and natural inequalities. It defends equality of outcome over equality of opportunity and the view that natural inequalities are, if bad, no less bad than social inequalities. This book has been accepted at the University of Copenhagen for a public defence as a Dr Phil dissertation.
著者について
Kasper Lippert- Rasmussen (born 1964), DPhil (Oxford), MA (Essex), Cand. Scient. Pol. & Exam. Art. (Aarhus), is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. He works primarily in ethics, political philosophy and informal logic. His articles on these matters have appeared in journals such as Journal of Political Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy & Public Affairs, The Journal of Ethics, Philosophical Studies, Politics, Economics & Philosophy, and Philosophical Books.
■目次
Preface
Sources
Introduction
1. Preliminaries
2. Deontology
3. Non-deontology
4. The charge of irrationality
5. The non-equivalence principle
6. Complexity
7. The act concept
8. The course of nature
9. Facts about behaviour
10. Harms
11. The concept of responsibility
12. Determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism
13. Ability to do otherwise and the transfer argument
14. Libertarianism
15. Moral responsibility without free will
16. Compatibilist responses
17. Defending the principle of alternative possibilities
18. The ideal of equality
19. Responsibility for being worse off
20. Telic versus deontic egalitarianism
21. In itself bad
22. Is inequality bad or is equality good?
23. Equally well off in terms of what?
24. Non-distributive egalitarian concerns
Deontology
1. Moral status and the impermissibility of minimizing violations
Introduction
The inviolability account
Challenges
Two conceptions of inviolability
Minimizing violations and responsibility
Inviolability and independence compared
Challenges
2. In what ways are constraints paradoxical?
Introduction
Nozick on side constraints
Scheffler: the puzzle of non-maximization
Kamm: expressing respect and concern for rights
Nagel: the impersonal value of constraints
3. Are killing and letting die morally equivalent?
The issue
Non-life-shortening killings and cases of lettings die
Why we should reject the actual sequence account of the prima facie wrongness of killing
The intuition about respect: Malm
4. Life-prolonging killings and their relevance to ethics
The conceivability of life-prolonging killings
Two challenges
Failing to notice the conceivability of life-prolonging killings-three examples
Why the conceivability of life-prolonging killings matters for moral theory
5. Two puzzles for deontologists: life-prolonging killings and the moral symmetry between killing and causing a person to be unconscious
Preliminaries
The possibility of life-prolonging killings
Some standard accounts of the wrongness of killings
The constraints against the killing of innocents
An agent-relative constraint against (life-shortening) killing?
Moral Responsibility
6. Er determinisme og moralsk ansvar forenelige?
Princippet om alternative handlingsmuligheder
Frankfurts kritik af princippet om alternative handlingsmuligheder
En deterministisk version af eksempel(A)?
Det moralske ansvars objekter
7. Does moral responsibility presuppose alternative possibilities?
8. Kompatibilisme og moralsk ansvar for undladelser af handlinger
Princippet om alternative handlingsmuligheder
Frankfurt om PAH
Undladelser af handlinger
Er Frankfurtske eksempler koharente?
Moralsk held og PAH
9. Frankfurt, responsibility, and reflexivity
Preliminaries
Frankfurt on freedom and moral responsibility
Reflective awareness and responsibility
10. Identification and responsibility
Preliminaries
Frankfurt on acting freely and moral responsibility
Higher-order volitions and values
Decisions and contentment
Planning and the desire to act on reasons
The authoritative and the authentic self
The whim problem
Identification and sources of identification
Conclusion
Equality
11. Arneson on equality of opportunity for welfare
12. Equality and responsibility
Introduction
Actual-and alternative-sequence egalitarianism
Arneson and Cohen on equality
Frankfurt on responsibility
Alternative-sequence egalitarianism
Actual-choice egalitarianism
Responsibility-robust egalitarianism
13. Egalitarianism, option luck, and responsibility
Introduction
Dworkin on option luck and brute luck
Unacceptable risks and the sufficiency view
Which probabilities? Which outcomes?
Differential option luck and responsibility
On the badness of inequality that reflect differential exercises of responsibility
14. Measuring the disvalue of inequality over time
15. Are some inequalities more unequal than others? Nature, nurture, and equality
Introduction
Social versus natural inequalities
Different distinctions
a) Nationalist and other restricted-scope egalitarians
b) The concern for inequality resulting from unfair treatment
c) Making versus allowing inequalities
d) Purely procedural egalitarianism
Conclusion
Appendices
Appendix 1: Methodology
Methodological elements
A coherentist account of the justification of moral beliefs
Foundationalism
Moral justification scepticism
Appendix 2: On defending a significant version of the constancy assumption
Introduction
The insignificance challenge
The challenge from extreme particularism
Contrast arguments
Summary
Bibliography
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