Global Collective Action

内容説明

This book examines how nations and other key participants in the global community address problems requiring collective action. The global community has achieved some successes, such as eradicating smallpox, but other efforts to coordinate nations’ actions, such as the reduction of drug trafficking, have not been sufficient. This book identifies the factors that promote or inhibit successful collective action at the regional and global level for an ever-growing set of challenges stemming from augmented cross-border flows associated with globalization. Modern principles of collective action are identified and applied to a host of global challenges, including promoting global health, providing foreign assistance, controlling rogue nations, limiting transnational terrorism, and intervening in civil wars. Because many of these concerns involve strategic interactions where choices and consequences are dependent on one’s own and others’ actions, the book relies, in places, on elementary game theory that is fully introduced for the uninitiated reader.

Tables amd Figures
Preface

1 Future Perfect
2 “With a Little Help from My Friends”: Principles of Collective Action
3 Absence of Invisibility: Market Failures
4 Transnational Public Goods: Financing and Institutions
5 Global Health
6 What to Try Next? Foreign Aid Quagmire
7 Rogues and Bandits: Who Bells the Cat?
8 Terrorism: 9/11 and Its Aftermath
9 Citizen against Citizen
10 Tales of Two Collectives: Almospheric Pollution
11 The Final Frontier
12 Future Conditional

References
Author Index
Subject Index Tables and Figures
Tables
2.1 Collective Action: General Rules of Thumb
3.1 Collective Goods: Examples, Strategic Implications and Provision Prognosis
3.2 Alternative Aggregation Technologies for Pure Public Goods
4.1 Taxonomy Based on Three Dimensions of Publicness: Supply Prognosis
4.2 Supporting and Detracting Influences on Subsidiarity
5.1 Alternative Aggregation Technologies for Health-Promoting TPGs
5.2 Key Insitutions in the Global Health Sector
5.3 Intergenerational versus Intragenerational Market Failures
6.1 LDC's Public Goods by Type and Spillover Range
7.1 Payoffs for a Better-Shot Public Good
7.2 Rogue and Possible Rogue States: Selective Military Indicators, 2001
7.3 Sixteen Largest Armies in the World, 2001
8.1 Transnational Terrorism: Events 1968-2002
9.1 Major Conflicts: Regional Distribution, 1990-2001
9.2 Select Civil Wars in 2001
10.1 Treaties Controlling Ozone-Depleting Substances
10.2 Atmospheric Concentration of Ozone-Depleting Gases
10.3 Carbon Dioxide Emissions of Major Polluters, 1990, 1996
10.4 Different Collective Action Factors Affecting Ozone-Shield Depletion and Global Warming
10.5 Percentage Reductions in Voluntaru Sulfur and NOx Emmissions by Country
11.1 Currently Operational Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs)
11.2 Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) in Development
Figures
2.1 Prisoners' Dilemma
2.2 Eight-nation Prisoners' Dilemma
2.3 Some alternative game forms for collective action
2.4 Cost sharing and Prisoners' Dilemma
2.5 Retaliation against a state-sponser of terrorism
3.1 Public goods where bi-ci>0
3.2 Welfare loss asociated with a nonrival, excludable public good
3.3 Five-person symmetric representations
3.4 Weakest-link public good with three contribution strategies
3.5 Three alternative aggregators for public good contributions
4.1 Alternative institutional forms
6.1 Sample CDF matrix
7.1 Better-shot game derived from Table 7.1
8.1 All incidents and bombings
8.2 Assassinations and hostage incidents
8.3 Deterrence and preemption games
9.1 Country months of civil war in the world: 1951-99
9.2 UN member's paid assessments to peacekeeping: 1979-2002
10.1 Transport matrix
10.2 Self-pollution percentages for 1990