Arms Races, Arms Control, and Conflict Analysis

内容説明

Demonstrating the ways in which work in a broad range of fields can be pulled together in the analysis of conflict, this book provides the reader with a general introduction to the principles of conflict analysis and lays a methodological foundation for the further development of the interdisciplinary field of peace science. The text begins with an extensive survey of arms race models, from the classic Richardson model to models exploring the effects of factors such as the domestic and international economic environment, public opinion and party politics, and weapons technology and information development. The processes of individual and group problem-solving, in both crisis and non-crisis conditions, are examined, drawing on work in economics, operations research, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Building on this diverse body of work, the author moves on to develop a framework for conflict management with which to approach a variety of conflict situations and applies this procedure to the United States-Soviet arms control conflict. Walter Isard is cited by Mark Blaug as one of the Great Economists Since Keynes (CUP, 1989 paper edition).

Book Description

Demonstrating the ways in which work in a broad range of fields can be pulled together in the analysis of conflict, this book provides the reader with a general introduction to the principles of conflict analysis and lays a methodological foundation for the further development of the interdisciplinary field of peace science. The text begins with an extensive survey of arms race models, from the classic Richardson model to models exploring the effects of factors such as the domestic and international economic environment, public opinion and party politics, and weapons technology and information development. The processes of individual and group problem-solving, in both crisis and non-crisis conditions, are examined, drawing on work in economics, operations research, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Building on this diverse body of work, the author moves on to develop a framework for conflict management with which to approach a variety of conflict situations and applies this procedure to the United States-Soviet arms control conflict. Walter Isard is cited by Mark Blaug as one of the Great Economists Since Keynes (CUP, 1989 paper edition).

List of illustrations
List of tables
Preface
Acknowledgements

1 Introduction and overview
1.1 The structure of the book
1.2 The nature of Peace Science References

Part I Basic framework and set of analyses
2 A survey of arms and race models
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The classic Richardson model and key extensions
2.3 The effects of resource constraints and linkage to the domestic economy
2.4 Arms, security, and the maximization of national welfare
2.5 Concepts and types of strategy in arms race models
2.6 Races with conventional and strategic weapons
2.7 The effects on races of asymmetry, uncertainty, technology, international tensions and key psychological factors
2.8 Organizational politics and the determination of the arms budget
2.9 The import of domestic political economy factors
2.10 Defense spending and alliances in an n-nation system
2.11 Arms races and the operation and functioning of the world system
2.12 Concluding remarks
References and additional bibliography
3 Individual and group behavior: noncrisis situation
3.1 Introduction and the general setting
3.2 Attitude as a basic variable
3.2.1 The 100 percent conservative
3.2.2 The expected payoff calculator
3.2.3 The 100 percent pessimist, the 100 percent optimist and the middle-of-the-road individual
3.2.4 The equiprobable expected payoff calculator
3.2.5 The utility maximizer
3.3 Interdependent decision making
3.4 A cognitive science approach to decision making
3.5 Concluding remarks
Appendixes
3.A Behavior associated with other types of attitude
3.B The relevance of game theory
References
4 A more formal cognitive framework for individual and group behavior
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Behavior of the individual as a decision-making unit
4.2.1 The action space of the individual
4.2.2 The individual as a perceiver
4.2.3 The individual as a believer and knower
4.2.4 The individual as a goal setter (aspirer)
4.2.5 The individual as a decision maker(chooser of an action or strategy)
4.2.6 The individual as a learner
4.2.7 The individual as a relocator (mover)
4.3 A former cognitive framework for understanding the group's behavior
4.3.1 The action space of the group
4.3.2 The group as a perceiver
4.3.3 The group as a believer and knower
4.3.4 The group as an aspirer or a target(goal) setter
4.3.5 The group as a decision maker(chooser of an actor or strategy)
4.3.6 The group as a learner
4.3.7 The group as a relocator
4.4 Concluding remarks
References
5 Decision-making behavior under psychological stress and crisis conditions
5.1 Introducoty remarks
5.2 Some preliminary remarks on Janis and Mann
5.3 Some preliminary formal structure
5.3.1 Stage 1: appraising the challenges
5.3.2 Stage 2: surveying the alternative actions available given the challenge
5.3.3 Stage 3-4: weighing alternatives and deliberation
5.4 Evaluation and futher extensions of the framework
5.5 Concluding remarks
References
6 Learning, problem solving and information research and development
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Problem solving as mental model construction
6.3 The use of artifical intelligence(AI) and other problem-solving methods oriented to external information
6.4 Investment in information research and development for problem solving
6.5 Concluding remarks
References
7 Policy space analysis: the choice of policies regarding arms expenditures and other issues and the value of information development
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Some basic aspects of policy space analysis
7.2.1 The traditional line case in two-dimensional policy
7.2.2 Isotims and isodapanes in two-dimensional policy space
7.3 Particular advantageous policy positions: lobby and related effects
7.4 Compromise points in policy space
7.5 Support (supply and market) area analysis in policy space
7.5.1 The support price gradient
7.5.2 Scale effects: the support price margin line
7.5.3 The constituent's net price line
7.5.4 Scale effects and marginal productivity: the net price margin line
7.6 Relocation of potential leaders: Hotelling-type analysis
7.7 Effects and value of information development
7.7.1 A search for the mode: gains and costs
7.7.2 Determining the investment value of information
7.7.3 Some complicating factors
7.8 Concluding remarks
Appendixes
7.A Some futher policy space analysis
7.B Further analysis of the election situation and information development
7.C Technical materials on the value of information
References
8 National security reasoning: the nature and effectiveness of plitical argument
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Some general remarks pertaining to political argument
8.3 A practical set of basic elements for political argument
8.4 Comparability of basic elements in a political argument and in decision-making analysis
8.5 The outlines of two significant political arguments on no first use of nuclear weapons in the European theater
8.6 The complex data base requirement
8.7 Some major problems in constructiong and evaluating more complex political arguments
8.7.1 Problems in determining and precisely stating consistent objectives
8.7.2 Problems with regard to the choice and definition of basic concepts
8.7.3 Problems with respect to presuppositions and related elements in the development of a political arguments
8.7.4 Problems with respect to the definition and sources of relevant knowledge
8.7.5 Problems in using historical materials in particular and setting upon pertinent historical interpretation
8.7.6 Problems in anticipating rebuttals and countering them
8.7.7 Problems with regard to the use of insiders' knowledge
8.8 Problems in developing justifications(warrants and backing) on a more involved level
8.9 Problems of dealing with possible worlds, succession of events and dynamics and plans
8.10 Problems associated with learning phenomena, crisis situations, system effects and multiple-target audiences(interest groups)
8.11 Concluding Remarks
References
9 World system models: Incorporation of military expenditures and arms trade
9.1 Introduction
9.2 The Leontief World Input-Output(I-O) model
9.3 The social accounting framework
9.4 The interregional linear programing model
9.5 Multicountry computable general equilibrium(CGE) models and trade matrix projection
9.6 The translog function, the comparative cost approach and trade flows
9.7 The potentials of the gravity model
9.8 The multimethod approach for trade projection and arms trade
9.9 The projection of military expenditures in the GCE, world econometric (LINK-type) and programming models
9.10 The GLOBUS model and potential developments
9.11 Concluding remarks
Appendixes: technical materials on multiregion general equilibrium models and use of the multimethod approach for construction of a trade matrix
9.A The general interregional equilibrium model
9.B A computable multiregion general equilibrium model
9.C The use of the multimethod approach to trade matrix construction in CGE models
9.D The use of the multimethod approach to trade matrix construction in the LINK model
References
10 Negotiation/mediation principles and qualitative and quantitative conflict management procedures
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Basic concepts and definitions
10.3 Conflict situation characteristics: identification of key characteristics for a given situation
10.4 Principles of negotiation (for a two-party conflict)
10.4.1 Principles for the preparation and analysis phase
10.4.2 Principles for the proposal-making phase
10.4.3 Principles for the interaction phase (to reach agreement)
10.4.4 Principles for the final packaging phase: enhancement of implementability
10.5 Principles of mediation (for a two-party conflict)
10.5.1 Principles for the preparation and analysis phase
10.5.2 Principles for the interaction phase
10.5.3 Principles for the final packaging phase: enhancement of implementability
10.6 Instances of past applications of the selected principles of negotiation and mediation
10.7 Constructing and illustration of qualitative conflict management procedures
10.7.1 The construction problem
10.7.2 Illustrations of qualitative conflict management procudures
10.8 Quantitative conflict management procedures: selection of a best or workable one
10.9 Concluding remarks
References
11 Potential for a specific application: the U.S.-Soviet arms control conflict problem
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Key characteristics of the U.S.-Soviet conflict
11.3 Key aspects and properties of a CMP for the U.S.-Soviet conflict
11.3.1 Security, uncertainty and restricted veto power
11.3.2 Limited or zero reliance on third-party intervention
11.3.3 Economic security maintenance and the use of models to generate essential economic information
11.3.4 Issue fractionation and logrolling for guaranteed improvement
11.3.5 The need for limited commitment
11.3.6 Balance-sheet and "issue-complex" analysis
11.3.7 Other useful aspects
11.3.8 Use of the time exploitation principle
11.4 Other basic aspects to which a CMP should be sensitive
11.4.1 Monitoring and inspection
11.4.2 Understanding enhancement and knowledge accumulation
11.4.3 Recognition of the play of personality and sociocultural factors
11.4.4 Continuous information research and development
11.4.5 Exploitation of the force of public opinion
11.5 Stability: an achievable property?
11.6 Some nonbasic factors
11.7 Concluding remarks
References
12 Sammary of Part? and conclusions

Part II Some advanced analyses
13 Synthesis of arms race models
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Synthesis: the Richardson side of the coin
13.3 Synthesis: the optimization side of the coin
13.4 Concluding remarks
References
14 Learning by a group, its leader and its individual members
14.1 Introduction
14.2 A qualitative approach
14.3 Toward a quantitative approach with members only learning
14.4 Toward a quantitative approach with leader and members learning
14.5 Generalizing to the hierarchical social system
14.6 Concluding remarks
Appendix: proof of "reasonable" convergence in model with leader and members learning
References
15 Information research and development from a dynamics system viewpoint
15.1 Introduction
15.2 A background static-type model
15.3 A dynamical systems learning model for the mediator
15.4 A dynamical systems learning model for a participant
15.5 Concluding remarks
References
16 Invention and innovation in information research and development for problem solving: an exploratory view
16.1 Introduction and general remarks
16.2 Basic variables and parameters in a two-equation (laws of change) model
16.3 Need and demand for invention (new conflict management procedures, discussion frameworks, and so on): the K factor
16.4 Communication (presentation) of need or demand: the ε factor
16.5 Invention, the production of creative ideas and scientific knowledge (basic research) and know-how (applied research or potential innovation): the K factor
16.6 Communication (transmission and diffusion) of creative ideas and scientific knowledge and potential innovation to locations of possible use: the l factor
16.7 Adoption and implementation
16.8 The role of policy
16.9 Conclusions
References
Notation
Author index
Subject index

List of illustrations
Figure 1.1 (a) Selected variables of the national and world economic (Production-Consumption-Trade) subsystem P.
(b) Selected methods (models) for the analysis of the behavior of the P subsystem variables and for the projection of their magnitude
Figure 1.2 (a) Selected variables and elemets of the national and international cognitive, decision-making, policy formation system C.
(b) Selected methods (models) for the analysis of (1) the behavior of variables, (2) policies and their changes and (3) other elements within the C subsystem
Figure 1.3 A system's structure
Figure 2.1 Deterrence and attack line
Figure 2.2 Nation J waging economic warfare
Figure 2.3 Reaction curves of nation J and L and Nash equiribrium points N and 0.
Figure 2.4 Optimal response curves for nations J and L that lead to a stable Nash equiribrium at N=0
Figure 2.5 Old and new deter and attack lines
Figure 2.6 The Choucri-North model of international violence
Figure 2.7 The GLOBUS framework
Figure 2.8 Arms races empirically analyzed
Figure 3.1 The indifference curves of J and L
Figure 3.2 A sequence of spilit-the-difference compromises
Figure 4.1 A formal cognitive science frame
Figure 5.1 Stages in crisis decision making
Figure 6.1 A problem model as a homomorphism
Figure 6.2 An analogy with the model for a base problem can be used to construct a model for a target problem
Figure 7.1 Clusters in a two-dimensional policy space
Figure 7.2 Support costs for different positions of political leader
Figure 7.3 Total support costs with support costs gradients more than proportional to distance
Figure 7.4 Isotims and isodapanes in policy space
Figure 7.5 Particular advantageous policy positions: critical isodapanes in policy space
Figure 7.6 Area of feasible agglomeration: one level of agglomeration
Figure 7.7 Area of feasible agglomeration: two levels of agglomeration
Figure 7.8 The support price gradient
Figure 7.9 Two competing political leaders
Figure 7.10 (a) Variation of abstinence price with constituency size: a cost curve to the leader. (b) A net constituent margin line
Figure 7.11 The constituent's net price line
Figure 7.12 The constituent's net price lines: two political leaders with different budget constraints
Figure 7.13 (a) A marginal productivity curve. (b) A net constituent margin line
Figure 7.14 Scale effects: two competing political leaders: (a) stable situation; (b) unstable situation
Figure 7.15 (a) A set of "unstable" separated positions. (b) A set of "stable" central location positions
Figure 7.16 (a) A set of "unstable" central location positions. (b) A set of "stable" separated positions
Figure 7.17 A temporary support area enclave: leaders with different gradients of constituent's net price line
Figure 7.18 A two-election tree
Figure 7.A.1 Competition between political leaders under conditions of nonconstant marginal productivity
Figure 7.A.2 Support areas of several political leaders located at the same position
Figure 7.A.3 Support areas of several political leaders located at two different positions
Figure 7.C.1 Two maximizers
Figure 7.C.2 A two-election tree
Figure 12.1 The circular flow of analysis
Figure 12.2 An agreed-upon time path of military expenditures
Figure 13.1 The generalized Richardson model in the MTR framework
Figure 13.2 The optimization side of the coin in the MTR framework
Figure 14.1 Flow diagram of the quantitive macro-micro (learning) model
Figure 14.2 Outcome function
Figure 14.3 Flow diagram of the general quantitative macro-micro (learning) model
Figure 14.4 Flow diagram of learning models
Figure 14.5 A linear learning model
Figure 14.6 Flow diagram of quantitative (learning) model with members and leader learning
Figure 15.1 Static model of workshop-type interactions
Figure 15.2 Dynamical systems learning model for a mediator Z
Figure 16.1 The process of invention and research and development: the generation and implemantation of creative ideas

List of tables
Table 2.1 Inputs and outputs for civilian and military industries
Table 3.1 A hypothetical outcome (payoff) matrix for Z
Table 3.2 Utility outcomes from deescalation in military expenditures
Table 3.A.1 A regret matrix
Table 3.B.1 The payoff matrix
Table 3.B.2 The game of Chicken
Table 4.1 Signature matrix: Arab-Israeli conflict
Table 7.1 Size of optimal sample and profits for selected costs per unit sample
Table 7.2 Effects of variation in α
Table 7.B.1 Outcomes for selected discount rates
Table 8.1 Summary of paragraphs in “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance”
Table 8.2 Summary of paragraphs in “‘No First Use’ of Nuclear Weapons”
Table 8.3 External references in “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance”
Table 9.1 A social accounts table
Table 9.2 Deviation from LINK baseline projections with endogenous defense spending: feedback from shocked arms race model
Table 10.1 Systemic structual characteristics
Table 10.2 Nonsystemic structural characteristics
Table 10.3 Participants' characteristics
Table 10.4 Selected principles of negotiation
Table 10.5 Selected principles of mediation
Table 10.6 Some hypothetical importance weights for the United States and Panama
Table 10.7 Selected properties of quantitative conflict management procedures
Table 10.8 A partial listing of quantitative conflict management procedures
Table 10.9 Conflict management procedures when (1) there is a small number of options, (2) participants can only rank outcomes and (3) participants focus on improvements
Table 11.1 Properties of a conflict management procedure for U.S.-Soviet arms control conflict