"An Inquiry into R. Rorty's View on Human Rights"
ABE Akira
last update: 20151225
An Inquiry into R. Rorty's View on Human Rights
ABE Akira
Abstract:
In this paper we try to present consistent interpretation of Richard Rorty's view on human rights and
sometimes to enlarge it through turning inward his thought in the larger context. He is trying to show how we
can extend the idea of human rights with our solidarity, though doubting the universality of that idea.
His view on human rights has two characteristics, namely, "anti-essentialism" and emphasis on sympathy.
The former is a premise and the latter is a conclusion in his view. We notice the conclusion and the issues
included in it.
Rorty thinks we need to cultivate the capacity to sympathize with others in order to extend "human rights
culture." To cultivate that capacity requires two conditions, namely, "security" and "irony." "Human rights
culture" will be universal by satisfying those two conditions and extending our intersubjectivity through
solidarity among us.
In this way, Rorty takes the function of sentiment seriously for extending "human rights culture." But we can
think he also regards reason as important on the other hand. When he emphasizes the continuation of our
"conversation", his intention is entirely to respect otherness.
Keywords: Richard Rorty, Human rights, Anti-essentialism, Sympathy, Solidarity
REV: 20151224